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Abstract 
 
In 1917, the February Revolution ended the Russian Empire and the Kuban’ Cossacks’ 
military obligations to the tsarist estate system. Kuban’ Cossack ethnic identity existed and 
evolved within the estate system prior to the 1917 revolutions. When the estate system collapsed, 
the Cossacks declared their identity as a separate ethnic minority. Backed by the Cossack 
villages’ democratic votes, Kuban’ Cossack elites and politicians created the Kuban’ People’s 
Republic, an independent anti-Bolshevik state, in the North Caucasus region. Designed to 
preserve local autonomy, settle disputes over land given to the corporate Cossack body in 
exchange for military service, and to avoid property confiscation by the Soviets and nonresident 
Russian settlers who lived among them, Cossack state-building represented both historical 
Cossack self-rule processes and modern state-building movements. At the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919, the Cossacks joined the Autonomous Republic of Mountain Peoples to 
create a chain of loosely federated states that offered full minority rights and facilitated local 
self-rule. Kuban’ Cossack resistance to Russian authoritarianism created problems between the 
Cossacks and their anti-Bolshevik allies in the Volunteer White Army. The Cossack separatists’ 
goals for a decentralized local government conflicted with the Whites’ attempts to recreate a 
unified and central Russian state. The Cossack struggle to preserve their identity, land, and 
autonomy motivated them to launch a liberating war to resist the emerging Soviet state.  
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Note on Dates and Transliterations 
 
With few exceptions, an effort has been made to preserve the historical dates in the 
Russian Old-Style Julian calendar rather than the Gregorian calendar used in the West. The 
Julian calendar lingered thirteen days behind Europe and the United States in the twentieth 
century. Entering Russia during this period meant stepping back in time. For example, the 
October 25th Revolution occurred on November 7 in the West, while Nicholas II abdicated 
during the February Revolution on March 3, 1917, rather than March 16, by the Old Russian 
calendar. From 1918-1923, the Bolsheviks replaced the Julian calendar with the Gregorian 
calendar. In the process of destroying the old world to create a modern proletarian utopia, the 
Soviets cut thirteen days from the year. Despite these reform efforts, the Orthodox Church and 
Russian peasants continued to mark holidays, feast days, and their ancestors’ agrarian cycle in 
the old style. The Soviets later alternated between a five and six-day revolutionary calendar and 
the Gregorian calendar that they considered more civilized than the Julian calendar. Where dates 
remain unclear by either calendar, the date provided by the original source has been used.   
- 
 The transliterations from the Cyrillic to the Roman alphabet adhere to the Library of 
Congress transliteration system both for prerevolutionary Russian and Soviet sources. In 
accordance with the Library of Congress system, the palletized soft sign (Ь) and the hard sign 
(Ъ) are indicated by an apostrophe (’) and a quotation mark (”), respectively. The long vowel yat 
(Ѣ), rendered obsolete under the 1918 Soviet orthographic reforms, and comparable to an æ 
sound, is represented by an ie⁀ mark in this work. Several names such as Wrangel, Krasnov, and 
Bogaevsky have retained the standard transliterated forms recognized in western academia.  
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Prologue 
 
The Kuban’, North Caucasus: Spring 1920      
 
 The sun felt hot on the Cossacks’ necks. Green bloomed over the steppe. Their horses’ 
hooves threw up a scent from the warm earth. Beneath black and white sheepskin hats, the 
Kuban’ Cossacks’ faces looked tense and hollow with alert dark eyes. Sunlight glinted on the 
white shoulder straps on their long gray cherkesska uniforms. Today, the war seemed quiet here. 
They had not seen any Soviet patrols. At home, the Cossacks ploughed in the muddy fields 
above the Kuban’ river. The men relaxed as their horses trotted down the hillside. As they 
plunged into a gully, a group of men wearing Cossack coats and fur hats moved in beside them. 
For moments, the horsemen moved together in easy, synchronized harmony. Then one of 
the newcomers challenged a Cossack to a race. The men galloped ahead. Suddenly, the soldier 
turned, slashing the Cossack across the face with his sword. He fell silently. Shouting and 
waving their sabers, the entire group swung on the Cossacks. Bewildered, the Kuban’ men could 
not understand why other Cossacks would attack them. Bunching together, the Cossacks whirled 
in gray waves to attack what they now recognized as disguised Bolshevik partisans across the 
open fields. Galloping, along the horizon, horses’ bodies outstretched, riders clinging low over 
their necks, the Kuban’ Cossacks drove the Soviets for a brief time from the Cossack lands.1   
 
 
 
 
1 Ivan V. Ovcharenko, In a Ring of Fire: Memories of a Partisan (Moscow and Leningrad: Cooperative 
Pub., Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1933), 87-89; Jacob Marschak, Recollections of Kiev and the 
Northern Caucasus, 1917-1918, University of California, Berkeley, Bancroft Library Oral History Center, oral 
history transcript, 1968-1971, 26; Alexander Paul Albov, Recollections of Pre-revolutionary Russia, the Russian 
Revolution and Civil War, the Balkans in the 1930s and Service in the Vlasov Army in World War II (Berkeley, 
California: University of California, Bancroft Regional Oral History Office, 1986), 286, 328.  
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Chapter I 
 
Identity 
 
Center and Periphery 
 
 
When the Tsarist state collapsed in February 1917, the Kuban’ Cossacks, a professional 
military caste and Russian minority group, met in Ekaterinodar, the Cossack capital in the North 
Caucasus, to discuss their future. They decided that although the class system with its military 
obligations had disappeared, the Cossack people would always survive. Months later, Cossack 
politicians declared the Kuban’ People’s Republic a separate state.2  
Kuban’ Cossack autonomy and resistance to the Russian state did not emerge for the first 
time in 1917. State-building developed as a modern solution to preserve the Cossacks’ existing 
rights but rose from historic Cossack independence and a prerevolutionary shift towards greater 
self-rule. During the nineteenth century, the Cossacks expanded on their democratic self-
government processes within the estate system called soslovie. The estate system’s collapse also 
did not create Cossack ethnic identity. The Cossacks already saw themselves as a separate people 
group. Tension remained between Cossack regional rule on the empire’s borders and central 
government authority. The revolution stripped away the estate structure restraining Cossack 
independence and the Kuban’ leaders moved into this void to make separatist goals a reality. The 
Cossack government’s resistance to dictatorship, attempts to protect their land and communities, 
and to develop a Kuban’ Army to insulate their borders brought the Cossacks into conflict with 
their allies in the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer White Army. Committed to monolithic Russian 
 2 Olga Andriewsky, “The Triumph of Particularism: The Kuban’ Cossacks in 1917,” Journal of Ukrainian 
Graduate Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 29-30; K. N. Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina (Sofia: Rossĭsko 
Bulgarian Publishing House, 1921), 7, 33-35; Hege Toje, “Cossack Identity in the New Russia: Kuban’ Cossack 
Revival and Local Politics,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol 58, no. 7 (November 2006): 1059-1060.  
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nationalism, the Whites criminalized Cossack separatism as samostiinost’ or treason. The 
Cossacks’ and their White allies’ opposing goals destabilized the anti-Bolshevik movement in 
South Russia and prevented them from developing a more unified front against the Soviets. 
Kuban’ Cossack ethnic identity and struggle for legitimate self-rule drove them to create a free 
state that rejected Russian control and resulted in sustained resistance against the Soviet state that 
extended beyond the boundaries of the Russian Civil War.   
Before the revolution, the Cossacks occupied a contradictory and ambiguous space 
between freedom and submission, warrior and peasant, and democracy and repression. While the 
Cossacks emerged as a mutable people group in the Ukrainian steppes, they evolved into a 
distinct ethnicity. The Cossacks, whose ancestors were born free or escaped serfdom, rejected 
dictatorship in all forms. In the late eighteenth century, the state developed a social estate system. 
The system sought to organize a multitude of social hierarchies and define class boundaries and 
mobility. It also established each class’s legal duties and privileges. The estate system defined 
the Cossacks’ mandatory service to the state. According to the estate system’s requirements, 
each male Cossack had to perform twenty years of military service. In return, the government 
gave the Cossacks land, exemption from poll tax, money dues (obrok), labor dues (barshchina), 
and the ability to retain local self-rule. For the Cossacks, land ownership represented freedom. 
Local rule and geographical distance from the center of power secured that freedom. By the late 
nineteenth century, the Cossacks experienced growing economic stress and tension between their 
military duties and their communities’ needs. Cossack freedoms, although limited by soslovie, 
represented greater autonomy than that offered to other groups in prerevolutionary Russia.3        
 
3 A. V. Remnev, Mark Von Hagen, and Jane Burbank, Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700-1930  
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007), 353-355; Shane O’Rourke, The Cossacks 
(Manchester University Press, 2008), 67, 70; Robert E. Johnson, “Paradigms, Categories, or Fuzzy Algorithms? 
Making Sense of Soslovie and Class in Russia,” Cahiers du Monde russe, vol. 51, no. 2/3, Dynamiques sociales et 
10 
 
When tsarist authority collapsed, Cossack-centric politicians and village assemblies that 
worked to increase Cossack autonomy within the estate system resurfaced to form a concrete 
political structure. Historic differences and growing tensions between the Cossacks and the 
inogorodnye, the Russian nonresidents in the Kuban’ region, strengthened Cossack identity and 
propelled them along the road towards an ethnic nation. The end of the estate system enabled the 
Cossacks to discuss their electoral voice, ways to preserve Cossack rights, address land issues, 
and expand their system of local administration. When the Provisional Government treated 
Cossack interests with indecision and hostility, the Cossacks turned back to state-building in 
order to defend their borders and prevent outside interference in their internal affairs as a means 
to an end. These actions forced the Cossacks into state-building during the Civil War.  
By 1917, no conservative, pro-Russian Kuban’ Cossack politicians existed and all voted 
for self-determination, forging a national identity and independent government that created 
issues for the Kuban’ People’s Republic. Problems in Cossack self-government emerged when 
the Volunteer Army criminalized Cossack separatism as treason and the Cossacks resisted 
attempts to bring them back under a central Russian authority. The Cossack fight for autonomy 
resulted in resistance to Soviet rule, complex relationships with their neighbors and allies, and  
 
classificationsjuridiques dans l’Empire russe: Du XVIIe siècle à la révolution de 1917 (Avril-septembre 2010): 463-
464; Elise K. Wirtschafter, “Social Categories in Russian Imperial History,” Cahiers du Monde russe, Écrits 
personnels, Russie XVIIIe-XXe siècles, vol. 50, no. 1, (Janvier-mars 2009): 231-234; Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Ascribing 
Class: The Construction of Social Identity in Soviet Russia,” The Journal of Modern History, vol. 65, no. 4 
(December 1993): 45; Peter Kenez, Red Advance, White Defeat (New Academia Publishing, LLC, 2008), 111-112, 
117-120; Smele, 34, 37, 50, 120-121, 123, 125; F. I. Eliseev, Kazaki na Kavkazskom Fronte, 1914-1917: Zapiski 
polkovnika Kubanskogo kazach’ego voĭska v trinadts⁀ati Broshiu⁀rakh-tetradia⁀kh (Moscow: Voenizdat, 2001), 
36-137; Jonathan D. Smele, The ‘Russian’ Civil Wars, 1916-1926: Ten Years That Shook the World (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 33, 48-49; Victor Serge and Susan Weissman, trans., Russia Twenty 
Years After (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 168; Brian J. Boeck, Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and 
Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 233-236; Edward 
Daniel Clark, Travels in Russia, Tartary, and Turkey (Aberdeen: George Clark and Son, 1848), 185, 204; William 
Sutherland, Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2004), 57, 75; Shane O’Rourke, Warriors and Peasants: The Don Cossacks in Late Imperial 
Russia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 35-38; Hugo Koehler, and P. J. Capelotti, ed., Our Man in the 
Crimea: Commander Hugo Koehler and the Russian Civil War (University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 140.   
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polarized the Cossacks between the anti-Bolshevik forces and the emerging Soviet state.   
 
Problems and Evolutions in Cossack Ethnic Identity 
The initial problem in interpreting Kuban’ Cossack identity remains rooted in their 
complex ethnic origin. The Cossacks’ origins in the untamed borderlands called the “Wild Field” 
(dikoye pole) in modern-day southeastern Ukraine remain unclear. These horsemen, known as 
“Cossacks,” from the Turkic word kazak or free man, emerged in the historical record after the 
Rus’ defeated the Mongols. Recent Russian and Ukrainian research indicates that the Cossacks 
appeared in the same region as the legendary nomadic and Indo-Iranian-speaking Scythian 
horsemen that populated the Eurasian steppe and then vanished in the third century B. C. E.4 
Early groups may be found by the late Middle Ages as descendants of the Slavs and Turkic 
steppe peoples like the Cumans and Kipchaks. From these blurred origins, the Cossacks emerged 
as a Slavic ethnic group that blended Ukrainian and Caucasian genetics. As feudalism declined 
in Western Europe and Moscow consolidated power in the sixteenth century, serfdom emerged 
in Muscovite Russia. Serfdom formed the primary relationship between the nobility and 
peasants. Serfs belonged to the master, bound to land given to the nobility, and had no legal 
voice. While Russian legal codes did not permit owners to sell peasants as moveable chattel, 
masters often sold serfs with the land. Men who refused to accept this unfree life escaped to the 
open steppe besieged by warring nomadic tribes, Turkish janissaries, and Crimean Tatars. As 
Ukrainian peasants fled to the north for safety, roving horsemen, runaway serfs, and migrant 
soldiers appeared in the demographical void in the Don, Dnieper, and Zaporizhia river regions.5  
 
4 Olena Goncharenko, “Historical and Cultural Origins of the Cossack Folklore of the Dnieper Region,” 
Periodyk Naukowy Akademii Polonijnej, vol. 31, no. 6 (2018): 110-113; Jaroslav Stepaniv, “A Turkish Document in 
Ukrainian from the Mid-Sixteenth Century on the Origin of the Ukrainian Cossacks,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 
vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1977): 217-218, 220-224.  
5 Prokin Petrovich Korolenko, Kubanskie Kazaki: Materia dlya istorīi Kubanskago kazach’yago voĭska 
(Kuban’, Russia: Kubanskii Sbornik, 1894), 1-2, 5, 9-10, 41-42; A. I. Denikin, The Russian Turmoil: Memoirs 
12 
 
During the sixteenth century, these horsemen with Ukrainian blood formed a warrior 
brotherhood in the Zaporizhia region. Cossack identity during the early modern period centered 
on free peasants, soldiers, and freebooters who chose an independent lifestyle in the Wild Field. 
Men who escaped to join the Cossacks remained free since the Cossacks refused to return them 
to serfdom. Forming defenses in sechi, or stockade forts, the Cossacks created the first 
democratic military communities in the area. By the early seventeenth century, the Cossacks 
shifted alliances between Moscow-led Russia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the 
Tatars, aligning with whomever offered more land and autonomy. Dedicated to a free elective 
process, Cossack leadership shifted between ataman and overlord, and retained this principle as a 
definitive mark of their identity. Prior to the establishment of certain Cossack military hosts, or 
voiskos, in the early eighteenth century, the Zaporizhian Cossacks possessed a developing ethnic 
identity. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the Zaporizhian Sech and the Cossack 
Hetmanate government operated as the dominant, semi-autonomous proto-state in the region.6     
The Cossack struggle for self-government threatened cohesive Russian nationalism and 
power. Attempts to subdue the Cossacks triggered a wave of rebellions that historians often 
 
Military, Social, and Political (London: Hutchinson, 1922), 240; Peter Kolchin, Unfree Labor: American Slavery 
and Russian Serfdom (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 36-44; 245, 
256; O’Rourke, The Cossacks, 7; Henry A. Landsberger, ed., Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change 
(London and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1974), 204, 210, 245; Witzenrath, 85; Sutherland, Taming the Wild 
Steppe, 201, 211; Lisa Gordon, Cossack Rebellions: Social Turmoil in the Sixteenth Century Ukraine (Albany: The 
State University of New York Press, 1983), 105, 191; Johann Gottlieb Georgi, “Chernomorskii kazak,” The New 
York Public Library, Opisanīe vsekh obitaiushchikh v rossīĭskom gosudarstve narodov: Ikh zhiteishkikh obriadov, 
obyknovenīi, odezhd, zhilishch, uprazhnenii, zabav, vieroispoviedanīi i drugikh, dostopamiatnostei. 
6  Michail Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 122, 224; Gordon, 75, 79; O’Rourke, The Cossacks, 37-38; John E. 
Hodgson, With Denikin’s Armies: Being a Description of the Cossack Counter-Revolution in South Russia, 1918-
1920 (London: Temple Bar Publishing, 1932), 124-125; Morgan Philips Price, My Reminiscences of the Russian 
Revolution (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1981), 94; Landsberger, 204, 212-213, 215, 221; Sokolov, 2-3, 18; Clark, 
185, 204-205; Wilton, 303-306; Durand, 34-36; Gregory P. Tschebotarioff, “The Cossacks and the Revolution of 
1917,” The Russian Review, vol. 20, no. 3 (July 1961): 206; Anatole G. Mazour, Russia, Past and Present (New 
York: Van Nostrand, 1951), 299, 350, 359; George C. Guins, Impressions of the Russian Imperial Government 
(Berkeley: University of California, Bancroft Regional Oral History Office, 1971, 66.    
13 
 
interpreted as peasant wars. Cossack numbers alone could not win against the state. Instead, the 
Cossacks ignited and led most major peasant uprisings in Russia and Ukraine during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.7 Against a background of popular unrest, Cossack 
dissidence and freedom stirred peasant admiration, sympathy, and support. Most famously, in 
1773, Yemelyan Pugachev’s rebellion erupted in part due to the Yaik Cossacks’ refusal to obey 
an imperial order to chase the migrating Kalmyk tribes and force them to return to Russian 
territory. Pugachev’s two-year rebellion unleashed a massive popular revolt. The Cossacks 
sought to free the serfs and usurp imperial power by declaring Pugachev the true tsar.8 
In response to uprisings that voiced peasant protest and threatened to destabilize the state, 
Catherine II broke the backbone of Cossack resistance. Between 1774 and 1792, the state 
abolished the Cossack Hetmanate and deported around 80,000 Zaporizhian Cossacks that 
supported Pugachev’s rebellion to the Black Sea region in the North Caucasus. Settling in 
villages or stanitsas along the Kuban’ River, the Cossacks patrolled the borders between the 
Caucasian tribes and the Ottoman Empire. As they pushed into the Caucasus Mountains, the 
Kuban’ Cossack military host received fishing rights, tax exemptions, and land tracts. Extending 
empire into the frontier resulted in violent guerilla warfare between the Cossack and Caucasian 
communities. Cossack presence also disrupted a flourishing indigenous slave trade to the 
Ottoman Empire. When Turkish or Circassian slaves and Russian serfs escaped into Kuban’  
territory, the Cossacks liberated them, hid them, and refused to send them back to their masters.9 
 
7 Landsberger, 204, 212-213, 215-216, 221. 
8 Witzenrath, 139; O’Rourke, Warriors and Peasants, 37; Khodarkovsky, 224; Hodgson, 124-125; Clark, 
185, 204; Wilton, 303-305; Mazour, 299, 350, 359; Guins, 66; Price, 94; Sarah Moncada, “Kuban’ Cossack 
Performance and Identity Negotiation in the Russian-Ukrainian Borderlands,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Michigan, 2016, 3-4; Sutherland, Taming the Wild Field, 56, 75. 
9 Austin Jersild, Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier, 
1845-1917 (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 12-13; Kuban’ Cossack oral history transcript, 
schedule A, vol. 26, case no. 511, Slavic Division: Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, 1950, 34-35; 
14 
 
The second problem in establishing Cossack identity lies in their contradictory nature. 
The Cossacks represented both democratic traditions and the arm of tsarist repression. They 
included elite and peasant. They both served and resisted the state. They fought indigenous 
peoples to extend imperial power into the borderlands yet respected and assimilated mountaineer 
culture into their own traditions. Collectively, they identified as something not quite Russian.10 
Incorporation into the Russian Army and the formation of large military hosts on the  
border did not mean integration. While the Kuban’ Cossacks adopted Caucasian dress, weapons, 
and fighting styles, they remained distinct from the indigenous peoples and the Russian settlers 
that later immigrated to the Kuban’. On the borderlands, the Cossacks remained geographically 
isolated. This decentralization fostered Cossack identity, culture, and autonomy.11      
      
A Rigid or Fluid Estate System: Questions in Cossack Soslovie 
 
This work endeavors to fill a historiographical gap by interpreting Kuban’ Cossack 
separatism within the premise that Cossack ethnic identity and self-rule existed prior to 1917 and 
evolved into state-building during the Civil War. For the Cossacks, the estate system evolved as 
 
Brower and Lazzerini, 242; Thomas M. Barrett, “Lines of Uncertainty: The Frontiers of the North Caucasus,” Slavic 
Review, vol. 54, no. 3 (Autumn, 1995): 578. 
10 Boris Kamyshansky, I Am a Cossack (London: Longmans Green, 1934), 12, 28-29, 33; Jersild, 12-13, 
314; Mazour, 158; Marjorie Letherbridge, The Soul of the Russian (London: John Lane, 1916), 54-55; Kellogg 
Durand, The Red Reign: The True Story of an Adventurous Year in Russia (New York: Century, 1908), 34-36; 
Francis McCullagh, With the Cossacks: Being the Story of an Irishman who Rode with the Cossacks throughout the 
Russo-Japanese War (London: Eveleigh Nash, 1906), 113-114, 167; A. Markov, Russkie kadety i iu⁀nkera v 
mirnoye vremia⁀ i na voĭne (San Francisco: General Cadet Organization, 1961), 81; Vladimir, S. Littauer, Russian 
Hussar: A Story of the Imperial Cavalry, 1911-1920 (Shippensburg: White Mane Publishing, 1993), 11-12; Robert 
Wilton, Russia’s Agony (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1919), 370; Price, 94.   
11 Eliseev, Kazaki na Kavkazskom Fronte, 128, 136, 163; Afrikan P. Bogaevskii, Vospominania⁀: 1918 
goda. Ledyanoĭ pokhod (New York: Izdanie Muzeya Belogo Dvizhenia Soyuza Pervopokhodnikov, 1963), 75; 
Obschestvo revnitelei Kuban’i, ed., Kuban’skoe Kazachestvo, Istoriko Literaturnii i illustrirovanii zhurnal’, no. 13 
(1931): 10-11, 20; Pshimaho Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization in the North Caucasus,” Caucasian Review, vol. 
1, no. 3 (1955): 46; Tschebotarioff, “The Cossacks and the Revolution of 1917,” 206; Guins, 66; O’ Rourke, The 
Cossacks, 153; McCullagh,167; Kenez, Red Attack, White Resistance, 37-39; Marion Aten and Arthur Ormond, Last 
Train over Rostov Bridge (New York: Julian Messner, 1961), 47; Victor M. Moltchanoff and Boris Raymond, 
Victor M. Moltchanoff: The Last White General, Berkeley, California: University of California, Bancroft Regional 
Oral History Office, 1972, 16; Clark, 209-210; Durand, 33; Wilton, 101, 307; 37-39; Price, 94.  
15 
 
a negotiation process between local government and the state. The fact that the Cossacks 
maintained a distinct culture and level of independence prior to the revolution suggests a legally 
restrictive but practically fluid estate structure. Rigid in obligations and privileges, the soslovie 
enabled the Cossacks to sustain and develop an existing identity within the system.12 
The modern discourse on Cossack identity and autonomy runs like a thin thread through 
broader discussions on revolution and definitions of the estate system in late imperial Russia. 
While excellent coverage exists on the Cossacks in early modern Ukraine, and on the Don, 
Terek, and Siberian Cossacks, there are few English-language academic articles and currently no 
full-length academic works on the Kuban’ Cossacks. Cossack separatism emerges intermittently 
in Peter Kenez’ Civil War in South Russia. The Cossacks’ role as a military force gains visibility 
with Laura Engelstein’s Russia in Flames chapter on the “War against the Cossacks”. Cossack 
autonomy plays a minor but thematic role in Jonathan D. Smele’s ‘Russian’ Civil Wars. Philip 
Longworth’s 1970 work, The Cossacks, Robert H. McNeal’s 1987 study, Tsar and Cossack, and 
Shane O’Rourke’s 2008 book, The Cossacks, form the trilogy of English-language academic 
sources on Cossack history. Peter Holquist explored the Don Cossacks’ transition from an estate 
to an ethnos in addition to a crucial study on de-Cossackization in the Don region. Shane 
O’Rourke contributed a critical study on the Don Cossacks in late imperial Russia and produced 
the first academic, book-length general history on the Cossack people since Tsar and Cossack.13    
 
12 Barbara Skinner, “Identity Formation in the Russian Cossack Revival,” Europe–Asia Studies, 46, no. 6 
(1994): 1017; Koehler, 140; Wilton, 314; Smele, 48-49; Sokolov, 7, 33-35; Serge, Russia Twenty Years After, 168. 
13 O’ Rourke, Warriors and Peasants, 3-10; Thomas M. Barrett, At the Edge of Empire: The Terek 
Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier, 1700-1860 (Westview Press, 1999), 110; Christoph Witzenrath, 
Cossacks and the Russian Empire, 1598–1725: Manipulation, Rebellion and Expansion into Siberia (Routledge, 
2007), 1-8; Kenez, 111-112; Laura Engelstein, Russia in Flames: War, Revolution, and Civil War, 1914-1921 
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There are currently two schools of thought on the development of Cossack identity. Some 
historians such as Peter Holquist and Ja-Jeong Koo contend that the estate system’s collapse 
created an identity void particularly for the Don and Kuban’ Cossacks. According to Holquist 
and Koo, the Cossacks sought to replace their anachronistic estate identity by turning to state-
building to create an alternative modern ethnic identity. The only historian to explore the Kuban’ 
separatist phenomenon in any depth, Koo argues that Cossack ethnic identity did not exist prior 
to 1917. Koo’s and Holquist’s arguments view soslovie as a rigid system that did not permit the 
Cossacks to have a preexisting ethnic identity before the revolution.14 
Historians Sheila Fitzpatrick and Peter Kenez similarly interpret the soslovie as a rigid 
system that paralleled the strict class system in eighteenth-century prerevolutionary France. It 
clearly defined class lines that did not permit preexisting ethnicity or evolution towards a new 
identity. Serhii Plokhy argues that Cossack ethnic identity only emerged as a concept during the 
nineteenth century as Cossack-centric leaders resurrected independence themes in mythical 
Cossack history to leverage greater political autonomy. McNeal, Longworth, and Koo view the 
system as inflexible since Cossacks could not engage in social mobility, change geographical 
locations, or avoid military service except under rare conditions. They also consider the 
Cossacks’ insular particularism ultimately doomed in an age of growing universalism.15 
In contrast to the rigid estate paradigm, Alison K. Smith, Olga Andriewsky, Gregory  
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Freeze, Vera Kaplan, and Martin Confino argue that the estate system represented a more fluid 
social construct. In this indefinite paradigm, the estate system permitted a level of identity 
formation. Robert Johnson grapples with the fact that while soslovie may have appeared legally 
straightforward, in practice the estates overlapped in an ambiguous social order. Confino admits 
that open questions remain in understanding soslovie, implying a fluid system that offered more 
autonomy in practice than in law. O’Rourke disagrees with Holquist’s argument that the Don 
Cossacks did not transition from an estate to an ethnic identity until the revolution. O’Rourke 
argues that Don Cossack ethnicity not only existed within the estate but expanded into greater 
autonomy that reflected a desire to return to the days of Zaporizhian Cossack self-rule.16   
 
Cossack Rights and Tsarist Oaths: Privilege and Obligation in the Estate System 
  
The estate structure controlled the Kuban’ Cossacks’ military obligations to the state. By 
best estimates, active duty Kuban’ Cossacks numbered ten divisions on the eve of the First 
World War. Behind them, the second and third ocheredi reserves readied 100,000 to 150,000 
men for rapid mobilization. The Cossacks also provided 12,000 men for plastun, or dismounted 
cavalry units. Between 1860, when the Kuban’ Cossack voisko officially formed, and 1917, the 
Cossacks carried their Zaporizhian identity into their Kuban’ homeland. They retained ethnic 
dress, traditions, and democratic practices brought with them from the lower Ukraine. By the 
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First World War, the Cossacks comprised twelve hosts stretching from the Don to the Black Sea, 
the Terek Cossacks on the Vladikavkaz line, and across Siberia to the Caspian Sea.17    
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the state relied on the Cossacks to 
defeat Napoleon Bonaparte, fight the Ottoman Empire, liberate France, control pogrom riots, and 
suppress popular unrest. These aspects of military service earned the Cossacks, who swore 
loyalty to the Tsar but not the state, both a violent and romantic reputation. Characterized as 
noble warriors, bloodthirsty reactionaries, or mythical horsemen, the Cossacks represented either 
an image of freedom or fear in the Russian and western mind. Anti-Cossack propaganda and 
stereotypes about twentieth-century Cossacks enabled German and Soviet troops to justify 
atrocities against Cossack soldiers and communities during the First World War and Civil War.18  
While the Russians considered the Cossacks a military caste rather than a separate people 
group, the Kuban’ Cossacks increasingly saw themselves as a distinct ethnos. The Cossacks 
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remained Slavic but ethnically diverse in their genetic composition. Over a period of five 
hundred years, the Cossacks’ rebellious instincts, heterogeneous ethnic makeup, military roles, 
and affinity for cultural synthesis evolved into a Cossack culture that separated them from the 
Russian nobility, gentry, merchant, artisan, and peasant classes.19  
As Cossack identity evolved within the estate during the late nineteenth century, some 
Kuban’ Cossacks remained divided on how they saw themselves: as Ukrainian Cossacks or 
Kubantsy. Unlike the Don Cossacks, Kuban’ Cossacks identified more closely with the Ukraine 
than with Russia. They clung to cultural habits and dress that connected them to their 
Zaporizhian past. Many still spoke with a slight Ukrainian accent. Kuban’ linguistics blended 
Ukrainian, Circassian, and later Russian words to create a local dialect called Balachka that 
Russian speakers often struggled to follow. Cossack words such as sotnia, monyet, and ataman 
differed from Russian words for military unit, ruble, and leader. In the Caucasus, the Cossacks 
named their stanitsas for their lost Zaporizhian villages on the Dnieper. Although the Kuban’ 
Cossacks did not consider themselves Ukrainians, they saw themselves as a separate people with 
strong historical ties to the Ukrainian land. Deeply Orthodox Christian, earthy, and democratic, 
the Cossacks remained both semi-independent and loyal servants of the Tsar. Cossacks traditions 
and freedom intrigued and mesmerized Russians who claimed the Cossacks as a unique part of 
Russian culture. Cossack songs, stories, and sense of self created a spiritual link to their past and 
anchored them to their Kuban’ homeland. By the mid nineteenth century, Cossack separateness 
assumed an “air of nationality” that identified them as something not quite Russian.20 
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By the late nineteenth century, Kuban’ Cossack dress continued to distinguish them from  
Russian peasants, workers, and urban middle classes. Cossack men wore red or white beshmet 
shirts over loose or narrow trousers. During the First World War, a black shirt replaced the 
conspicuous, traditionally red shirt in an effort to reduce Cossack casualties. Over the beshmet, 
Cossacks wore a long, tight-fitting cherkesska uniform with wide sleeves and ornamental 
cartridge pockets across the chest. While dress uniforms looked flamboyant, many active duty 
Cossacks wore shabby homespun cherkesski over non-regulation, homemade beshmets. A niello-
silver enameled kindjal, or double-edged dagger, tucked into their narrow leather belts. Rather 
than using the heavy and unwieldy Russian cavalry saber, Cossacks quickly adopted the curved 
Caucasian shashka. Light and strong with a guard-less wooden pommel, the shashka’s wide arc 
and displaced center of gravity made it a flexible and effective combat weapon.21  
 Until the Crimean War period, many Kuban’ Cossack men still clung to cultural habits 
that connected them to their Zaporizhian past. Some hid the forbidden loose or braided scalp lock 
under longer hair or by tucking it behind one ear. Shaved heads with scalp locks, adopted from 
their Turkish and Tatar enemies, later disappeared. Some Kuban’ men, particularly in His 
Majesty’s Cossack Convoy, shaved their heads in summer. Others wore their thick straight dark 
hair cropped short under black or white lambskin papakha hats. Many Kuban’ men wore long, 
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drooping mustaches that linked their ethnic identity to their Zaporizhian ancestors. “Exceedingly 
handsome and dead shots,” observed a British correspondent in 1914, the Kuban’ Cossacks also 
stood taller and thinner than the average medium height Russian soldier.22  
Military posture and distinct sense of self infused Kuban’ Cossacks with a calm, graceful, 
and controlled bearing. To outsiders, Cossacks looked stern until their faces relaxed into smiles, 
or they burst into song or dance. Cossacks often moved slowly but could exhibit lightning-fast 
reflexes when necessary. Kubantsy walked with a flair, resting their left hand on their hip or 
dagger hilt. They flourished their right hand while speaking for emphasis. Sensitive, perceptive, 
and formal, the Cossacks projected dignity and confidence. Russian and European visitors to 
Cossack homes reported the Cossacks’ warmth, kindness, generosity, and hospitality.23       
On the eve of the First World War, the Russian Imperial Army underwent a 
modernization process. The Cossack cavalry, which refused to adopt any military organization 
other than their own, experienced few changes. The Cossacks persisted in using their own 
military terms, calling a lieutenant a horunzhy, their captain an esaul, and their colonel voiskovov 
starshina, or host elder. Since the regular army considered the Cossacks irregular cavalry, 
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Russian officers tended to look down on Cossack officers due to their different military training. 
Cossack cavalry combined with regular cavalry units and the Caucasian volunteer Native Horse 
Division, known as the “Wild Division,” brought Russian cavalry strength up to fifty divisions 
with 120,000 men. Each army corps contained a cavalry division. Each division had a Cossack, 
Hussar, Dragoon, and Lancer regiment. Each Cossack regiment had six sotnias, or companies. 
Each sotnia had one hundred men. The Russian cavalry formed the largest force of trained 
horseman in modern warfare at that time. Although traditionally trained as cavalry, Kuban’ 
horsemen adapted professionally to trench warfare. Most fought Turkish troops, allied with the 
Central Powers, and Kurdish tribes along the Caucasian front during the First World War.24  
Compulsory, universal military service disrupted and reframed Cossack life. At age 
eighteen, every male Cossack entered twenty years of mandatory military service. What it meant 
to be a Cossack at a local level intertwined with their estate identity and created tension between 
their villages’ needs and the demands of military service. Most Cossacks married prior to 
entering the service. A Cossack hoped to start a family and provide his parents with an extra 
worker while away or in case he died on active duty. During the First World War and Civil War, 
Cossacks fought Turkish troops, Kurds, and Soviets in steep mountains, muddy trenches, and hot 
steppes. They starved, slept on frozen ground, mourned dead friends, and often did not see their 
families for years. During this period, most villages remained empty of fighting-age men. When 
Cossack regiments went into winter quarters, some wives traveled to visit their husbands. For 
most, the distance and expense required to travel from the North Caucasus proved prohibitive. 
Cossacks allowed to go home on leave found the train journey long and costly, often leaving 
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them only two weeks to spend in the village. A dead Cossack left behind a family shriveled by 
grief and impoverished by the loss of their main breadwinner.25   
On entering the army at eighteen, each man rigorously practiced riding, shooting, and 
drilling. While the army provided peasant conscripts with military gear, a Cossack had to report 
for duty bringing his own horse, saddle, equipment, uniform, and sidearms. The state provided a 
nine-pound Berdan rifle, ammunition, cabbage soup, meat once per week for a Cossack, and 
fodder for his horse. Compared to Caucasian regiments that often appeared for service fitted out 
with horses and gear worth between 800 and 1,000 rubles, a small and sturdy Cossack horse and 
its equipment cost around 150-200 rubles. Cossacks loved horses and yearned to own the larger, 
faster, and warm-blooded Kabardian horses that cost 200 to 500 rubles.26   
At age twenty-one, a Cossack entered a four-year service term. At twenty-five, a Cossack 
could go home for four years. During this time in second-line service, men exercised their horses 
and cared for their uniforms. Every spring, they left their stanitsas to train for a month. 
Completing this four-year term, a Cossack only had to provide his uniform, weapon, and horse. 
Due to systematic training and organization, twenty-five to thirty-year-old soldiers had active 
duty experience and mobilized quickly on demand. By age thirty-five, men entered the reserves. 
They completed their twenty-year obligatory service as opolchina, or militia units.27   
Despite what outsiders considered Cossack privileges, many Kuban’ families lived in 
such poverty that they spent their last funds providing weapons, a uniform, and a horse so that 
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their sons could fight the state’s wars. Sometimes a family had too many sons and could not 
afford a horse for each one. Many families, too poor to buy a combat animal, had to purchase a 
horse on credit. Often a man died in battle before he could pay off his horse. A Cossack’s horse 
then transferred to a horseless man in his regiment while his commander sent the sale money 
back home to the Cossack’s wife or father in the stanitsa. When a Kuban’ man could not afford a 
horse by any means, he joined the plastuny, or dismounted Cossack regiments.28   
The Kuban’ Cossacks integrated Zaporizhian fighting traditions such as the lava 
equestrian attack with Caucasian guerilla tactics that frequently made the difference between 
victory and defeat. The Cossacks used guerilla warfare tactics gleaned from centuries of fighting 
Tatars and Circassians. When allowed to follow their own irregular tactics rather than standard 
European military protocol, the Kuban’ Cossacks lost fewer men in battle than regular Russian 
troops. During the Russo-Turkish War in 1877, the Russian war artist Vasily Vereshchagin 
observed how Russian soldiers lined up in the open to fight, while Kuban’ Cossack officers gave 
their men freedom to adapt their fighting methods to the situation in ways that helped them pick 
off enemy troops from a sheltered position while conserving their numbers. Tucking their 
cherkesski into their dagger belts, the Cossacks crouched behind bushes and trees, glanced out, 
fired, and ducked back again.29 During the First World War, Cossacks swam their horses across 
rivers, crawled across shell-shot wasteland, and emerged suddenly from trenches for night 
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attacks. Barbed wire failed to stop them. Throwing their rugged black felt burka cloaks over the 
razor wire, the Cossacks leaped down on surprised Turkish or Austrian troops.30      
During the Russo-Turkish War, the First World War, and Russian Civil War, Kuban’ 
horsemen also deployed a cavalry tactic called the lava. Designed to confuse and surround the 
enemy, the lava helped to offset the difference between outnumbered Cossack units and larger 
forces. At Tsaritsyn in 1919, as the Soviets appeared in the distance, a Cossack regiment 
composed of six sotnias deployed facing them in a chain formation. A quiver ran through the 
ranks as a strong emotional bond tightened between the men. In that moment, each soldier 
became a man’s brother, his family, his village. When the commander raised his shashka, the 
sotnia flared out in a wild gallop. Dust billowed across the steppe. They could almost see their 
enemies’ faces. Suddenly, the mass split apart. Cavalrymen wheeled in all directions. Horses 
leaped to the side or skittered backward. Delighted at the Cossacks’ retreat, the enemy lunged 
after them. Then the Cossack chain fused back together with lightning speed to engulf the 
enemy’s flank and rear. This irregular cavalry tactic succeeded due to each Cossack’s individual 
fighting quality and the intuitive support that the men gave each other. Rather than allowing the 
Cossacks to utilize this underused tactic and form an extended line to execute a lava attack, some 
Russian commanders ordered the Cossacks to line up in a dense formation to intimidate the 
enemy. These bulky columns presented a larger target and often resulted in heavy losses.31  
A Cossack officer remained on close, respectful, and equal terms with his soldiers. 
Trapped between military orders and practical concerns, Cossack officers hated needlessly 
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risking their men’s lives. Cossack officers often acted independently apart from the Russian high 
command when analyzing the situation on the ground. They also took personal responsibility for 
their men, knowing that they had to face their wives and families when they returned to the 
village. In contrast to Russian soldiers, herded together based on physical similarities and led by 
officers with no personal connection to them, Cossack troops usually came from the same 
village. Common ethnic identity and local relationships created close-knit units. On the 
battlefield, Cossacks refused to leave wounded comrades behind, risking their lives to carry them 
out or give them an Orthodox burial under gunfire. During the 1917 revolutions, Kuban’ Cossack 
troops generally maintained order. Most Cossacks refused to betray or kill their own officers.32   
 
Cossack-centrism  
 
Since the Cossacks’ formal organization into a military estate, the government denied the 
Cossacks the right to elect their own supreme ataman. The Tsar remained absolute commander 
over the host. Below the emperor, the state appointed a Russian governor-general, or nakaznyi, to 
command each Cossack voisko. The general often knew little about the Cossacks and remained 
remote from their lifestyle. Although Cossack nobles obtained land grants for military rank and 
service, the Cossacks resented this lack of choice. Elite sons trained in regular military schools or 
entered the Cossack College in St. Petersburg. While Kuban’ Cossacks retained their own 
schools adjoining traditional army colleges, they held themselves slightly aloof. During the 
reform period in the 1860s, the Cossack elites prioritized a “Cossack-centric” focus that merged 
the elites with the Cossack rank and file in a shared ethnos. Kuban’ Cossack elites and peasants 
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resisted the imposition of the zemstvo system, a post-reform structure designed to administer the 
provinces (oblasti) in bureaucratic strata from the village to the senate level. Between the end of 
the eighteenth century and the revolution, Cossack elites and intelligentsia struggled with the 
War Ministry over the legitimate head of the Cossack host. Tensions continued between concepts 
of pan-Slavic unity and Cossack separateness.33   
Cossack privileges and collective identity remained central to the Kuban’ nationalist 
movement. While military service placed the Cossacks squarely within the estate system, the 
decentralized nature of the Cossack soslovie enabled Kuban’ Cossack identity to exist and evolve 
within the estate. The land given to the Cossack host in exchange for their military service 
created tensions between Cossack landowners and Russian tenants in the North Caucasus. 
Growing efforts for self-government, conflicting land rights, the economic strain imposed by 
military service, and discussions about the Cossack estate as an anachronistic system increased 
towards the early twentieth century.34 The social and economic patterns, hierarchies, and 
bitterness bred under serfdom and unresolved in the late imperial period created a complicated 
and volatile relationship with the land and those that owned it.  
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Chapter II 
Land 
 
Localism and Spatial Identity in the Kuban’  
 
 
The broad Kuban’ River, flowing between silver willow trees, announced the entrance to 
the Cossack lands. In the distance, the jagged Caucasus Mountain peaks thrust up from broad 
grassland steppes. Geographically isolated from the country’s interior, the Kuban’ Cossacks 
retained a direct, local self-government process and forged a deep connection with the land. Until 
1917, daily life in the Caucasus remained largely insular apart from military duties that disrupted 
agricultural rhythms and the family economy. The obligation to perform twenty years’ military 
service both gave the Cossacks their land and took them away from it. The land remained a 
tangible symbol of compensation for the heavy weight placed on the Cossacks by military 
service. Since the state granted these lands to the corporate Cossack voisko, the Cossacks could 
not buy, sell, or privately own communal land. When not called upon to die for the Tsar, the 
Cossacks engaged in herding, fishing, and farming the fertile black soil fields.35  
 When the Cossacks first settled along the Kuban’ River, thousands of escaped serfs and 
soldiers settled there with them. Peasant flight to the North Caucasus escalated during the 1820s 
after the government resettled groups of state peasants there. Private serfs also pursued rumors 
about freedom and tax exemption in the south. In 1826, Nicholas I declared that serfs that fled to 
the Caucasus would receive heavy punishments. Despite the state’s punitive stance on fugitive 
serfs, thousands flooded into the Caucasus until the abolition of serfdom thirty years later. These  
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outsiders settled beside the Cossacks where local authorities ignored their unfree origins.36 
Due to a labor shortage in the Caucasus, the Kuban’ Cossacks also sent agents north to 
incite serfs to flee south. Armed by the Cossacks, men returned to the Don and central Volga 
regions to rescue their families from serfdom. Fugitive serfs swarmed to the fortress at Anapa to 
receive Cossack protection. Some of these fugitives, turned bandits, adopted the persona of free 
Cossacks.37 “Always going about armed like Zaporizhian Cossacks,” these groups did not have 
the Cossacks’ sense of ethnic identity and did not embrace their military obligations.38 At the 
same time, Cossacks sheltered ex-serfs in farms and stanitsas, hired them to work in their fields, 
or enrolled them in Cossack service. Free settlement and the rarity of the manorial village, the 
primary social formation in rural Russia before 1861, characterized the socioeconomic landscape 
in the North Caucasus. By 1857, less than three percent of the Black Sea Stavropol province, and 
the Kuban’ and Terek territorial divisions (oblasty) had a serf-based land system.39 The Cossack 
regions represented the smallest percentage of serfs in the entire Russian empire.    
Until the October Revolution, the Cossacks practiced simple and self-sufficient socialism. 
For non-Cossacks, the commune (mir) represented the first link in the authority chain extending 
from the peasant household to the state. Cossack self-government bypassed regular civilian 
administration. It rose from the village assembly (sbor) to the Cossack host administration, to the 
Nakaznyi Ataman, and then to the Tsar. The entire Cossack community voted on decisions 
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involving elections, land distribution, and fishing rights. They rotated fields among their 
neighbors, sharing animals or farm equipment as needed. Individual freedom otherwise remained 
broad. In 1918, the Cossacks initiated a land reform program that combined evolving attitudes 
towards private property with traditional estate concepts. While the Cossacks welcomed private 
property ownership, they rejected land socialization and insisted that the land remain within the 
Cossack host patrimony. Many preferred to redistribute voisko land on a private ownership basis 
exclusively to Cossacks rather than to Russian nonresidents living in the area.40  
After the abolition of serfdom in 1861, the state implemented the zemstvo system 
throughout rural Russia. The zemstvo, a bureaucratic structure designed to collect taxes, improve 
rural conditions, and administer 43 provinces from the village to the senate level, offered former 
serfs the chance to participate in local government via elected delegates. The Cossack assembly, 
led by a popularly elected ataman, allowed all male or female heads household heads to vote on 
local affairs. Rather than accepting the zemstvo system that required them to rely on delegates 
rather than voting as a community, the Cossacks fought to retain their own local elections. They 
rejected efforts to incorporate them into the new system because it also threatened to turn them 
into a taxed peasant estate. In a practically unanimous decision, most Cossacks resisted sending 
delegates to the zemstvo because they feared this would transfer property from the voisko to the 
zemstvo and from military to civilian control. If this transition occurred, it could allow 
nonresident settlers to gain control over Cossack land.41   
 
40 Denikin, Russian Turmoil, 240; Kenez, Red Attack, White Resistance, 38-39; Hodgson, 30; G. V. 
Nemirovich- Danchenko, Krymu pri Vrangelie⁀: fakty i itogi (Berlin: R. Oldenburg, 1922), 9; Wolley, 88; Toje, 
1061; Price, 94; McNeal, 165; Leon Trotsky, “The Lesson of the Mironov Affair,” 16 September 1919, order no. 95, 
in How the Revolution Armed, 428; I. Borisenko, Sovetskie respubliki na Cevernom Kavkaze in 1918 godu (Rostov: 
Knigoizdatel’stvo Severn’iĭ Kavkaz, 1930), II:5.  
41 Paul E. Heineman, “The Last Cossack Rebellion?: The Campaign to Implement the Zemstvo on the 
Don,” Canadian-American Slavic Studies, vol. 46, issue 3 (January 2012): 311; A. E. Janke,  “The Don Cossacks on 
the Road to Independence,” Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, vol. 12, no. 3 (Fall 1970): 
274; Alfred J. Rieber, “Landed Property, State Authority, and Civil War,” Slavic Review, vol. 47, no. 1 (Spring 
31 
 
In the 1860s, the Cossack hosts proposed laws to prevent the zemstvo from interfering in 
their internal affairs. During the anti-zemstvo crisis in the 1870s, the Don leaders threatened to 
cut the host off from Russia, “surround it with an impenetrable barrier, and within this enclosed 
circle to create an entirely separate internal administration.”42 Similar movements proved 
underway in the Kuban’. Cossack nationalist politician I. L. Makarenko vigorously protested the 
zemstvo that threatened Cossack self-sufficiency. By 1917, Kuban’ Cossack nationalists, elites, 
and peasants voted that the Cossack people would remain better off without state interference.43  
During the Russian legal codification in 1835, the state standardized the terms for 
Cossack service. According to the estate system, the Cossack host owned the land communally. 
Cossacks received no pay for military duty except a rye ration and a rotating land allotment. The 
state determined that a Cossack earned thirty desiatiny or 81 acres of arable land for performing 
military service. By 1900, this number shrank to between nine and twenty-three desiatiny, an 
average of 24.3 to 62.1 acres per Cossack. Although Cossacks farmed with traditional methods, 
they also employed new agricultural techniques from Western Europe, and knew how to ship 
their produce on time to maximize freshness for the northern markets. Each year, householders 
gathered to redistribute land for each family’s needs. The redistribution system demonstrated 
how the Cossack commune not only worked to redistribute land effectively but sought to 
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responsibly balance limited resources with land utilization to promote collective wellbeing.44 
Each land allotment depended on a Cossack’s rank. Once a Cossack became a 
commissioned officer or reached the ninth grade on the Table of Ranks, he received noble status 
for life. The government granted Cossack elites non-rotating land without hereditary rights. In 
addition to lifetime land security, Cossack nobles received a small army salary. Although many 
supplemented this meager income by renting out land, Cossack elites still did not earn enough to 
place them on equal social and economic footing with the Russian nobility.45 
As individually allotted land strips dwindled between 1900 and 1917, many Cossack 
households struggled to sustain their families and generate a ready cash income required to fulfil 
military service’s financial demands. Meanwhile, the financial costs associated with military 
duty continued to rise. Compared to the increasingly impoverished Don, where the voisko could 
only spare around 46 rubles towards a Cossack’s service expenses, the Kuban’ voisko remained 
somewhat more prosperous. Working from a budget that ran in the black, more from effective 
administration than from surplus resources, the Kuban’ host typically contributed an average of 
107 rubles to a Cossack who could not afford horse or equipment. Although Cossacks could not 
sell communal land to defray military costs, renting out fields to the nonresidents worked as a 
short-term solution. Land rents provided the host with its highest profits, but the increase in land 
rental highlighted the inflexible nature of land supply. Renting out strips significantly reduced 
the amount of land available for Cossack families’ use, perpetuating a cycle of land insufficiency 
and tensions between Cossack landowners and nonresident tenants.46  
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Black Earth and Land Hunger 
 
The end of serfdom exacerbated existing agrarian issues when the 1861 statutes 
transferred land to village communes collectively rather than to individual peasants. While the 
government compensated landowners a total of 902 million rubles out of a national budget of 3.4 
million rubles for releasing their unfree labor force, the rural gentry experienced widespread 
insolvency from property loss up until 1917. Former serfs also could not privately own property 
until they succeeded in paying off the redemption dues on the land. Many destitute former serfs 
ended up paying rates of 5.6 percent annual interest for insufficient, infertile, or marshy land. By 
1905, 9.5 million out of 12.3 million peasant households throughout the fifty western Russian 
provinces received scattered land strips distributed via the village commune system (obshchiny). 
Under this land commune structure, the village owned and redistributed land based on the 
number of “mouths” in the village. In the absence of private land ownership, land redistribution 
ensured that no family received only poor quality or over-stripped fields. Despite these efforts, 
many peasants ended up with narrow strips scattered miles apart and subject to the commune’s 
traditional, inefficient, and low-yield three-field cultivation method.47  
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For rural Russians, their identity remained deeply rooted in the land. In prerevolutionary 
Russia, the word mir represented both the village commune and the world. The concept of mir 
also represented the real and idealized elements of Holy Russia, a people and space both literal 
and figurative, spiritual and earthly. For the Cossacks, the Kuban’ space created a sense of 
homeland that did not extend to the rest of Russia. The land physically and emotionally bounded 
the corners of their world. In the peasant worldview, the soil belonged to the whole world. In a 
perspective born from serfdom, peasants believed that the land belonged to the people that 
worked it rather than to the land’s legal owners. This conviction encountered complications 
when peasants, obsessed with the desire for more land, could not explain why the earth that 
belonged to everyone should belong to them more than to their neighbors. Sufficient fertile land 
not only meant the difference between starvation and survival but offered former serfs a sense of 
material security. As peasants endeavored to increase their land holdings, some did not hesitate 
to resort to violence against the land’s legal owners to improve their situation.48  
Land shortages, inequalities, and agrarian disasters fostered “land hunger” (malozemel’ie) 
as peasants struggled for subsistence and longed to expropriate land from landowners. The  
end of serfdom created a national land question as former serfs and peasants pursued a level of  
land ownership and mobility previously denied to them. In the post-serfdom reform period,  
particularly between the agrarian failure in 1891 and resettlement legislation in 1901, the  
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government opened up the North Caucasus to ease agrarian pressures and stimulate peasant 
immigration. Land-hungry peasants flooded into Cossack lands. They found that the Cossack 
voisko already possessed large land tracts. In contrast to a gentry dominance in central Russia 
and the Don area to the north, the Kuban’ region had few large landowners but many middling 
farmers and poor peasants. A handful of Cossack elites owned 1,000-2,000 acres in rich arable 
land. Bitter divisions emerged, not along standard class lines, but between Cossacks and  
inogorodnye nonresidents. A complicated agrarian question developed.49      
The influx of landless peasants into the Kuban’ area created a new land shortage issue. 
Although the Cossacks owned the majority of land, they did not represent a numerical majority. 
Between the Circassians and the immigrants, the Cossacks made up 46 percent of the 3 million 
people in the Kuban’. Within this demographic, 27 percent of the nonresidents owned land. As 
rents rose, so did the outsiders’ resentment. Nonresident workers migrated to the capital at 
Ekaterinodar where they formed a radical, anti-Cossack core. In spite of the acreage inequalities,  
many nonresident peasants eventually became wealthier than their Cossack landlords.50   
The land sufficiency question remained dominant in the government’s minds. Following 
the 1905 Revolution, the state recognized the destabilizing danger that popular unrest  
posed for the empire. Tsar Nicholas II established the Duma, an elected legislative body that  
permitted popular representation. The First Duma and Second Duma, composed from more 
liberal groups such as workers, peasants, and the empire’s non-Russian peoples, proposed 
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sweeping reforms too radical for the tsarist regime to accept. The Moscow Peasant Congress 
argued for land appropriation from the gentry landowners (pomeshchiki) without compensation. 
Other elites such as the Russian gentry and Cossacks pursued liberal policies until faced with the 
threat of forcible land loss. After the Tsar dissolved the Second Duma, the Third Duma swung to 
the political right. From 1907 to 1911, Prime Minister Piotr Arkadyevich Stolypin instituted land 
reforms aimed at quickly deconstructing the peasant commune and facilitating private 
ownership. The peasant commune’s rapid dissolution, failure to grant full legal rights such as the 
right to inheritance, and the scramble to claim available land created new tensions. Due to their 
refusal to transition to a taxed peasant estate and the government’s unwillingness to release them 
from service, the Cossacks remained under the voisko communal land system.51 
 
The Cossacks versus the Inogorodnye 
 
 
 
The 1835 charter granting the Kuban’ Cossacks land in the North Caucasus remained 
vague about whether the Tsar’s warriors owned unconditional rights to the voisko land. In 1866, 
the Temporary Committee for the Review of Cossack Statutes nearly applied the redemption 
law, which required former serfs to recompense the state for the land, to the Cossacks. The 
 
51 Witte, 380, 388; Paul G. Klebnikov, “Agricultural Development in Russia, 1906-1917: Land Reform, 
Social Agronomy, and Cooperation,” The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1991, 142-143, 148; 
Anita B. Lampe-Baker, “The Development of the Peasant Commune in Russia,” The Journal of Economic History, 
vol. 41, no. 1, The Tasks of Economic History (March 1981): 185-186; O’Rourke, “The Don Cossacks during the 
1905 Revolution,” 594-595; Mary Schaeffer Conroy, Emerging Democracy in Late Imperial Russia: Case Studies 
on Local Self-Government (the Zemstvos), State Duma Elections, the Tsarist Government, and the State Council 
before and during World War I (University Press of Colorado, 1998), 142; Atkinson, 770, 776-777, 783; Judith 
Pallot, Land Reform in Russia, 1906-1917: Peasant Responses to Stolypin's Project of Rural Transformation 
(Oxford University Press, 1999), 172; Corinne Gaudin, “‘No Place to Lay My Head’: Marginalization and the Right 
to Land during the Stolypin Reforms, Slavic Review, vol. 57, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 747, 773.  
* Following the Stolypin agrarian reforms, the peasant commune no longer had administrative tenure or 
fiscal control over the land. Land no longer reverted back to the commune upon the head of the household’s death 
and land ownership now moved outside the mir’s control when sold to an outsider. Those peasants that opposed 
ukreplenie reforms generally did not want absentee migrant workers to return to claim their share from the former 
communal lands. The commune’s rapid and inorganic dissolution under the 1911 reforms contributed to local chaos 
but enabled around 2.2 million peasants to become private landowners before 1917. 
37 
 
committee decided not to move in this direction because it would allow Cossacks who paid off 
their dues to privately own and sell land to non-Cossacks. They worried that this type of 
economic framework might conflict with the Cossacks’ military duties. Rather than clarifying 
the voisko’s land ownership rights, the committee let the charters stand without clarification. In 
the 1880s, the War Department and state bureaucracy reinforced the idea that defining Cossack 
land rights would infringe on the Tsar’s right to dispose of these lands by imperial ukase. While 
the government gave the Cossacks land for military service, they refused to issue legislation 
guaranteeing the Cossacks unalienable rights to their land.52  
  The state’s ambiguous position on the Cossacks’ legal right to the land brought Cossack 
landowners and inogorodnye renters into conflict. Nonresidents remained outside the Cossack 
estate system. They did not have permanent resident status since they held internal passports 
from the regions from which their ancestors emigrated. Over time, the outsiders came to consider 
the land that they rented as their property. The Cossacks believed that the land, bought with 
blood as payment for their military service, could not belong to anyone except the corporate 
Cossack community. They viewed the increasingly radical inogorodnye as encroachers on 
Cossack property. Tsarist authorities continued to hedge declaring exactly who owned the land 
occupied by the Cossacks and the nonresidents. Instead, the government offered a vague 
recognition that both Cossacks and nonresidents had rights to the same land.53 
While the Cossacks pursued their own self-government system in the Kuban’, the  
inogorodnye also struggled to assert local power. Nonresident deputies carried the outsiders’  
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demands before the Duma, requesting the state to enforce the zemstvo in Cossack regions to give 
the nonresidents more weight in local government. The Cossacks recognized the problems that 
self-government presented in a region that contained a heterogenous population. They agreed 
that the inogorodnye deserved to have a voice in local affairs. Unresolved issues regarding land 
and representation eventually exploded into conflict after the October Revolution.54   
 
Volya and Soslovie: Problems in Cossack Service and Government 
 The land issue intersected with autonomy at the village and voisko levels. By Russian law 
and Cossack tradition, the voisko remained an autonomous, self-sustaining corporate body. The 
Tsar stood at the top. The state appointed a non-Cossack Nakaznyi Ataman as governor-general 
over the host. Tensions remained between the myth of loyalty between Tsar and Cossack and 
their collective memory that harked back to free Cossack ancestors that escaped authority to rule 
themselves in the open steppe. The image of the free Cossack, an emphasis on free will (volya), 
and popular law concepts still resonated strongly with the Kuban’ Cossacks. Ultimately, the 
Cossacks remained torn between estate privileges and the desire for autonomy.55   
In the years prior to 1917, the Cossacks remained committed to private property 
principles that involved houses, yards, gardens, stables, and personal property, while accepting 
the estate system’s conditions that the land belonged to the corporate Cossack voisko. The 
contract between Tsar and Cossack, land in exchange for military service, grew complicated and 
economically devastating for the Cossacks in the years before the revolution. While the myth of 
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Tsar and Cossack connected them with service ties to the emperor, the Cossacks also 
experienced an underlying resentment towards the system that that laid heavy military and 
economic burdens on them. The Cossacks’ attempts to assert volya highlighted the inherent 
tensions between autocracy and democracy and between state-rule and self-rule.56   
 In 1835, when the state formalized the Cossack estate’s terms and conditions, they 
recognized the Cossacks’ rights to historic forms of self-government represented in stanitsa 
assemblies also known as sbory. The Cossacks retained the right to elect their own ataman to 
administer village affairs. During election times, household heads gathered in the sbor to elect an 
ataman. Atamans now played a trusted and critical role in local government as they handled daily 
business, heard petitions, settled disputes, explained new laws, collected taxes, arrested 
criminals, negotiated problems with land cultivation, and convened the assembly. Some atamans 
administered multiple villages within their jurisdiction. During the Civil War, one disabled 
Cossack colonel ran twenty-three stanitsas. Standing between the government and the people, 
atamans held both popular and state support. In the struggle between local atamans and the state 
during the late nineteenth century, the government became unable to curb the popular leaders’ 
power. Instead, the government began to grant broad autonomy to Cossack atamans.57    
Cossack stanitsas ran on a democratic and community participation basis. All Cossacks 
obeyed the communal will voiced by the village assembly. In an agrarian-based society, land 
concerns took precedence over administrative concerns. Cossacks traveled to the sbor for a 
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critical issue or after bringing in the harvest. As men gathered in the stanitsa hut, the ataman 
opened the meeting. Cossack assemblies debated an issue in an attempt to vote impartially for 
the community’s good. Once the discussion climaxed, the ataman rang a bell to take a vote. The 
Cossacks shifted their positions. Those in favor stood on one side of the room and those against 
it lined up on the other. By Russian law and Cossack tradition, a two-thirds vote carried the day. 
When faced with a contentious issue such as land redistribution, the Cossacks recognized the 
need to preserve harmonious relationships with their neighbors. Although the result could not 
please everyone, the Cossacks wanted to present their final decision as unanimous. When clearly 
outvoted, the minority gradually stopped protesting and joined the majority in accepting the 
group decision. Due to this direct decision-making process embedded in community, the 
Cossacks had greater participation in their own rule than other peasant groups in Russia.58 
 During the 1870s, the government attempted to enforce the zemstvo system to prioritize a 
nationality and property based electoral process in the western provinces. When Alexander II 
introduced the zemstvo into Cossack territories to universalize Cossack particularism, the 
Cossacks pushed back with fear and anger against what they saw as an attempt to turn free 
Cossacks into taxed peasants. In contrast to the zemstvo system, the Kuban’ host chose not to 
levy direct personal taxes on its population. For Cossack elites, balanced between their slight 
military salary and limited income from land rental, zemstvo taxes threatened to reduce their 
already precarious standard of living. The tax also primarily targeted land ownership. A personal 
tax on land owned corporately added insult to financial loss. The Cossacks blamed the zemstvo 
for placing new restrictions on them, imposing shocking new taxes, and for failing to understand 
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the Cossack way of life. Bowing to Cossack refusal to pay taxes or delegate their direct voting 
power, the state permitted the Cossacks to continue to integrate their own military with civil 
government. Sustained Cossack resistance to the zemstvo emphasized the incompatibilities and 
tensions between local and central government.59  
As the Cossacks grew more politically insular, they also experienced evolving liberalism 
and social consciousness. During the late nineteenth century, the army increasingly ordered 
Cossack soldiers to carry out internal police duties. Although the image of brutal police 
repression entered the public’s experience and imagination, only a tiny percentage of Cossack 
society, the first four-year units filled with twenty-one to twenty-five-year old men, had to act in 
this capacity. Prior to 1905, Cossack participation in putting down widespread unrest remained 
minor. Cossack troops generally stayed on reserve, scattered among estates or villages where 
authorities suspected that local unrest that might lead to property loss or arson. Despite atrocities 
committed by various groups during Stenka Razin’s and Yemelyan Pugachev’s seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century revolts, Cossack traditions, songs, and stories did not praise knouting women 
or setting peasant villages on fire. Instead, they saw themselves as heroic warriors defending 
Mother Russia. The Cossacks’ chivalric self-image as honorable soldiers and free men conflicted 
starkly with the government’s reliance on them as an internal control force.60  
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This social issue created a tension between the Cossacks’ self-image and their primary 
peacetime use. Forced to face how the government used them to suppress popular protest, the 
Don and Kuban’ Cossacks voiced their growing unhappiness at being forced into police duty. 
Both Cossacks and peasants often conceptualized a bureaucratic wall separating a good Tsar 
from a corrupt administrative system. This same wall created a sense of distance and futility that 
separated the Tsar from the people. Recognition that their progressively primary use to the state 
lay in crushing resistance to the regime began to demystify the Cossacks’ spiritual link between 
them and the Tsar. When ordered out during the 1905 Revolution, some Cossack units protested 
that the people had done nothing wrong and that they did not want to be used against them. 
While most Cossacks remained loyal to the Tsar’s person, their active and passive protests 
highlighted the deepening fractures in their increasingly fragile commitment to the state.61     
Mobilization for police duty also presented an economic issue. Often occurring during 
the spring planting or autumn harvest seasons, this duty removed the Cossacks from their 
villages at critical points in the agrarian cycle. The labor shortage caused economic hardships 
and resentment. The Cossack situation reached a crisis point during the summer of 1906 when 
the government called men up to guard landowners’ properties in the black earth regions. The 
army ordered some Cossack units to perform police duties rather than sending them to the 
Manchurian front to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. Sending troops to pacify an area fraught 
with agrarian tensions could actually incite revolt. Kuban’ Cossacks stationed around gentry 
estates to protect private property demonstrated growing sympathy with peasants’ grievances. 
The Second Eisk Regiment of Kuban’ Cossacks, quartered in Kursk, found themselves separated 
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from their officers, divided up into small units, poorly fed, and surrounded by a hostile 
population. As their women shouldered the heavy field labor back home, the Cossacks observed 
similar village rhythms and empathized with peasant concerns. Alienated from their land and 
forced to act as police rather than warriors, the Cossacks became restless, homesick, and 
discouraged. In these cases, Cossacks reacted as a corporate body against their repressive use. 
They wrote three anonymous letters to the Kursk governor, begging to be sent back to the 
Kuban’. Some officers defied the War Ministry’s orders and accommodated unhappy Cossack 
troops. In August 1906, infantry General Ivan A. Karass assumed responsibility for allowing 
twenty-two forlorn Cossack sotnias go home without waiting for their reinforcements to arrive.62        
By 1906, the Cossacks’ use as internal police to protect pomeshchiki land loomed against 
a background of economic pressures, mass mobilization, and resources directed towards the 
Japanese war effort. As the government required the Cossacks to act in a repressive capacity, this 
usage demoralized and disheartened many Cossacks. The more that the government used them 
for repressive actions, the more the Cossacks began to reject the idea that their primary purpose 
lay in suppressing the state’s enemies. Growing self-awareness, historic concepts of volya, 
empathy with peasant grievances, and evolving understanding for non-Cossack perspectives 
further destabilized their attitudes towards the state. Heavy Cossack deployment in the second 
and third turns and financial burdens from military service worsened economic conditions at 
home. The economic ramifications caused by estate obligations during the 1905 Revolution and 
First World War drove Cossack farms steadily towards collapse.63  
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In the 1890s, the government began to recognize the toll that its demands took on 
Cossack communities. Under Nicholas II, the state organized an investigative commission to 
identify causes and solutions for Cossack poverty. During several years’ research, General 
Nikolai A. Maslakovets reported that military service’s economic and demographic burdens had 
systematically ruined the Cossacks. Families struggled to provide horses and equipment. Many 
scrounged necessary cash together by selling off essential produce and livestock. Cossacks could 
not replenish the depleted home economy due to labor loss from 10 percent of the able-bodied 
male population absent on peacetime service. When the second and third turn reserves mobilized 
during wartime, the number rose to thirty percent of the male population. By the First World 
War, all able-bodied men except for the last reserves left their villages for the Caucasian front.64   
Weather unpredictability, agricultural practices, and land insufficiencies contributed to 
severe famines in the Volga, Ukraine, and the Caucasus in 1892. Cossacks leaving for active 
service recognized that despite their women’s capable efforts, their farms would not only fail to 
produce an agrarian surplus for the northern markets but might not keep their families from 
hunger that year. In an effort to relieve this service-induced economic disaster, Maslakovets 
advised turning the Cossacks into a peasant estate. The commission understood that the 
government would decline to release the Cossacks from fighting its internal and external wars, 
and the Cossacks would resist surrendering their warrior traditions for a taxed peasant status. In 
an attempt to ease the pressure that many Cossack households experienced, the government 
issued 100 rubles to Cossack families that had men called up from the third reserve in October  
1905. The War Ministry, however, refused to reduce any military obligations.65 
 
64 McNeal, 168, 180; Volvenko, 349-350, 354; Janke, 273; O’Rourke, Warriors and Peasants, 71-72, 80; 
Holquist, “From Estate to Ethnos,” 92; Mironov, 445-447; Longworth, 281; O’Rourke, The Cossacks, 140, 144. 
65 O’Rourke, “The Don Cossacks during the 1905 Revolution,” 585-587; McNeal, 165-166; Carol Leonard, 
Agrarian Reform in Russia: The Road from Serfdom (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 239; Volvenko, 360.  
45 
 
“The Cossacks seemed to be rooted to their land” 
 
 
Economic pressures coincided with Cossack deployment, the struggle against  
estate boundaries, and conflicted relationships with nonresidents in the Kuban’. When the 
Russian government opened up immigration to the Caucasus, offering preference to Russian 
settlers over other ethnic minorities, they attempted to foster Russification and assimilation. The 
plan backfired. Rather than resolving the land question, immigration caused friction between the 
newcomers and the Cossacks. The state’s attempts to prioritize a national culture, blur ethnic 
differences, and foster a united Russia created an opposite effect. Russian immigration efforts 
strengthened Cossack identity. An official commission, sent to investigate land issues in the 
Caucasus in 1911, discovered conflict rather than compliance. Until the empire’s last days, the  
government largely failed to perceive how its Russification and immigration policies divided the  
people that it sought to unite and nurtured separatist impulses by enforcing centralization.66    
Cossack nationalism, emerging during the 1917 revolutions, reflected a desire to expand 
upon traditional freedoms and retain their estate land. “The Cossacks . . . seemed to be rooted to 
their land, and held on with their claws and teeth,” Leon Trotsky observed in 1919.67 The Kuban’ 
Cossack independence movement resulted less from an identity void than historical patterns in 
Cossack identity, autonomy, and growing resistance to a centralized government. Driven by a 
commitment to Cossack volya and in an attempt to secure their freedoms, the Cossacks moved to 
establish an independent Kuban’ state.  
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Chapter III 
 
Autonomy 
 
 
Prelude to Revolution  
 
 
 Russia’s experience in the First World War intensified economic pressures, exacerbated 
agrarian issues, and deepened social inequalities. Most Kuban’ Cossack units that had gone to 
fight the Turks on the Caucasus border in 1914 had not seen their families for three years. Some 
Cossacks mobilized in 1910 did not return home for seven years. Defeats, casualties, and 
political intrigue undermined national morale. Unrest burst into violence. In the capital at 
Petrograd, hungry and angry crowds waving red flags rioted in the streets. Protestors smashed 
shop windows, slaughtered policemen, opened the prisons, and alternately cheered and cursed 
Don and Kuban’ Cossack troops riding through the city. During the war, the government 
routinely stationed Cossack policing units throughout northern cities. In February, some Kuban’ 
Cossack reserves replaced jaded Don Cossack patrols. Fresh from the village and unused to 
crowd control, the Kubantsy demonstrated a soft spot for the women and children protesting the 
bread shortages. In a move that identified them with the people, the Cossacks fraternized with 
the crowd and refused to fire on the demonstrators surging through the streets. Cut off from 
Petrograd at the front and pressured by his staff, Nicholas II abdicated the throne on March 3.68 
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“Bread, Peace, and Land” 
 
 
A Provisional Government formed in the power gap. Led by Premier Aleksandr 
Kerensky and the Duma ministers that forced the Tsar to abdicate, the Provisional Government 
proposed to stabilize the situation and continue the war. A Constituent Assembly, formed from 
elected delegates across the nation, would choose Russia’s future government and decide critical 
issues such as “bread, peace, and land.” News about the February Revolution trickled through to 
the Cossacks, leaving them uncertain but committed to their military oath. When he heard about 
the Tsar’s abdication, one Cossack officer exclaimed, “The Cossacks will feel bad.” “It will be 
just the opposite,” a Kuban’ Cossack officer retorted. “It will make life easier for everyone.”69  
The front lines began to disintegrate. Soldiers’ councils or soviets took over the army that 
spring. Many soldiers discarded discipline. They attacked officers on sight, tore off their 
shoulder-straps, and often killed them. When the summer offensive began, officers pleaded with 
their troops to fight. As the lines collapsed and soldiers refused to advance, some units composed 
of trained combat officers mounted charges alone. Anarchy reigned in the Cossack regions as 
deserters poured back through the countryside. Kerensky attempted to reassure the Cossacks by 
withdrawing troops from the area. The government pulled steady troops back to fight 
revolutionary activity, baring entire sections on the eastern front. Distant from the centers of 
power, the Kuban’ region remained more stable in these early months. In Ekaterinodar, soldiers’ 
soviets, urban workers, and nonresidents soon seized control over local administration.70   
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In the early days, the Cossacks stood apart. “We fell into an enchanted circle,” Colonel 
Feodor Eliseev remembered.71 While the Kuban’ Cossacks generally demonstrated political 
unity, most only vaguely understood the shifting politics occurring at a distance. In a period of 
massive social change and upheaval, many welcomed the revolution as a chance to recover their 
traditional independence. The old forms of democracy retained within the informal states 
represented by the Cossack hosts created a basis to formalize Kuban’ self-government. 
Following the monarchy’s collapse, the Cossacks convened a Cossack Congress in Petrograd. 
They declared their determination to keep order until the Constituent Assembly met.72 
The rising Bolshevik party attempted to disrupt Cossack solidarity by dividing them 
between elite and peasant. Soviet agitators branded Cossack officers as counterrevolutionaries 
and appealed to common Cossacks to rise against them and assist Soviet power. Armed soldiers 
in trucks rumbled into Cossack camps. They pressured them to join revolutionary rallies and 
arrest their officers. Many Cossacks distrusted the soldiers’ intentions and refused to arrest their 
officers. When the soldiers demanded, “Point out the worthless officers and we ourselves will 
arrest them!” most remained silent.73 A few discontents seized the opportunity to get rid of 
unpopular officers and elect new ones. Cossack soldiers’ meetings typically centered on 
economic rather than political concerns. During the unrest that gripped the country, a 
psychological shift also swept over Cossack regiments as men began to demand pay for years of 
service. Few Kuban’ Cossacks ended up attending rallies. In many regiments, not a single 
Cossack wore a revolutionary red bow. For the most part, applying Marxist class theories to the  
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complex Russian social system failed to produce definite divisions along class lines.74  
Although the estate system ended, the Cossacks continued to fulfill their military orders. 
They restored order to the railways and guarded property, industrial centers, and communication 
lines. Despite discipline and determination, Cossack units constituted too few horsemen scattered 
along a 1,500-mile-long front and thousands of miles of railway lines. As military and social 
disintegration continued, the Kuban’ host struggled to reestablish order in the area. They begged 
the Don Cossacks to spare a few sotnias to help them since it had become “impossible to breathe 
for comrades.”75 In July, the Cossacks helped put down the Bolshevik uprising at Kronstadt. 
These activities shifted the Soviets’ opposition onto the Cossacks. The Provisional Government 
also began to regard the Cossacks’ actions as counterrevolutionary behavior. While they 
supported the government, the Cossacks kept hoping for a decision that would grant them full 
legal rights to the land given to the voisko under the estate system.76     
 
The Cossack Question 
 
The critical “Cossack question” centered on land. After reading Communist newspapers 
and visiting a few meetings, the Cossacks understood the threat to their survival if the Bolshevik 
party seized power. In late August 1917, the Soviets announced their intentions regarding private 
property ownership in a Peasant Mandate. The mandate would not only prohibit Cossacks from 
privately using voisko land but also prevent them from buying, selling, renting or mortgaging it. 
This meant that Cossacks who worked their way up in the ranks to elite status and leased land 
not only lost lifetime land ownership but could no longer earn any money from renting it out. An 
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additional clause that awarded property to the people that worked it meant that the inogorodnye 
now felt justified in their claims to Cossack land that they currently rented. The Soviets also 
ordered public and private properties expropriated and turned into workers’ communal property. 
On October 26, a land decree issued by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets confirmed 
that “landed proprietorship is abolished . . . without any compensation.”77 In a move that echoed 
a new type of serfdom, the sweeping property socialization included estates, forests, rivers, 
livestock, stables, farm implements, orchards, vineyards, and natural resources. Now the 
pomeshchiki would not own large estates and exact serfs’ labor dues. Instead, the Bolsheviks 
proposed to nationalize land and maximize production in the people’s name. Cossack peasants 
who opposed land expropriation still had to wait for the voisko to distribute land to them 
individually. Although the October 26 decree targeted large landowners and permitted “working” 
Cossacks to keep their land, most Kuban’ Cossacks saw the new land mandates as a threat to 
both to their corporate voisko property and the Cossack people.78    
Throughout the summer, the Provisional Government continued to waver on the 
“Cossack question.” In a move to appease both the Cossacks and the inogorodnye, the 
government declared that both groups could claim “historical rights” to the same land. This 
indecision increased tensions by making the Cossacks uneasy and encouraging the nonresidents’ 
unofficial claims to the land. The government refused to declare the Cossacks’ continued rights 
to their land or permit them to elect their own Nakaznyi Ataman. Rather than risking alienating 
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either the Cossacks or the nonresidents, the government left it to the future Constituent 
Assembly’s discretion to solve this agrarian puzzle. At the All Russian Peasant Congress, Victor 
Chernov, Minister of Agriculture and Social Revolutionary party member, declared that since the 
Cossack host held large land tracts, they would have to turn over portions to the nonresidents.79 
Cossack delegates then went to the Soviet meetings to hear what they had to say. They listened 
unhappily to speeches encouraging anarchy and approving land confiscation. The Cossacks 
returned to the Cossack Congress to report that the Soviet was “no place for them.”80 
The “Cossack question” dragged on towards autumn. Although the government planned 
to relocate to Moscow to stay closer to the Cossack epicenters, they failed to prioritize convening 
the Constituent Assembly. The government also refused to betray the revolution by dealing 
decisively with the Soviet threat. Instead, Kerensky spent the critical summer months mingling 
with the Soviets and negotiating with the emerging Bolshevik leader, Vladimir Ilych Lenin.81  
  The Cossacks saw no place for themselves in this new revolutionary world. While they 
backed the Provisional Government, they did not welcome Kerensky’s flirtation with the 
Bolsheviks. Many Cossacks, while loyal to the former Tsar, also did not want to return to 
autocracy. The radical socialist and anti-Cossack speeches voiced in Soviet meetings continued 
to alienate the Cossacks. The Soviets’ intentions to eliminate the Cossacks as a caste only 
strengthened Kuban’ Cossack corporate identity. The public remained uncertain about the 
Cossacks’ true allegiance: for or against the revolution. No one heard the Cossacks’ voice as a 
group since they had not clearly stated their political position at this time. By the time that the 
All-Russia Cossack Congress met, even the more liberal Cossacks could not tolerate the 
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Bolshevik agenda. At Ekaterinodar in July, every Kuban’ Cossack socialist at the District 
Executive Committee walked out of the meeting and formed their own voisko soviet. For the next 
several months, the Cossacks balanced between the state and the revolution in the quest for the 
future of their estate privileges.82  
 
“We Are Cossacks, We Don’t Need Parties” 
 
In the regions where imperial power gradually eroded Kuban’ Cossack freedoms and 
autonomous traditions remained deeply embedded in cultural memory and local government. In 
March 1917, a Cossack assembly met in Ekaterinodar to discuss their future. They recognized an 
identity shift following the end of tsarist military obligations but argued that they held an identity 
apart from the estate system. They decided that no matter what happened, the Cossack people 
would always survive. When Colonel Orekhov, a Black Sea Cossack lawyer, advised a group of 
North Caucasus Cossack leaders that they needed to secede immediately, mobilize a Kuban’ 
Army, and secure their borders, many felt reluctant to take such radical steps at that time.83 
Many Kuban’ Cossacks, descended from old Zaporizhian bloodlines, welcomed the 
opportunity to openly rule themselves again. When General Mikhail P. Babich, the Russian 
Nakaznyi Ataman, quit his post, a Kuban’ council (Rada) sprang up and began electing atamans 
in defiance of old tsarist restrictions. The election campaign created lively competition between 
the Black Sea Kuban’ Cossacks (chornovtsy) and the Cossacks on the Terek line (lineitsy). Terek 
Cossack A. P. Filimonov won the supreme ataman post on October 25, 1917. Filimonov worked 
to integrate Cossack self-government traditions with efforts to secure their old estate privileges.84  
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In the past, the Cossacks generally held themselves aloof from politics. During the 1905 
and 1917 revolutions, the Cossacks experienced growing social awareness. Despite political 
inexperience and Cossack-centrism, some Cossacks began to observe and empathize with the 
soldiers’, workers’, and peasants’ social inequalities. They understood that the non-Cossacks in 
the Kuban’ had the right to a voice in local politics. While they resisted giving up host land, the 
Cossacks met to discuss land issues and electoral participation with the nonresidents.85 
Some Provisional Government members such as Aleksandr Guchkov called for a pan-
Cossack congress that would include Cossacks across the former Russian Empire. Unlike the 
diverse liberal and conservative parties that intersected the Russian political scene, the Kuban’ 
Cossacks saw no need for different parties. “We are Cossacks, we don’t need parties!” one man 
declared at the Ekaterinodar assembly in March.86 Although different shades of political opinion 
existed, the Cossacks had experience resolving their differences as a community through the sbor 
forum. Even when all did not agree on an issue, the Cossacks endeavored to reach a consensus 
after an open discussion. As national loyalties shifted between tsarist, Kadet, Bolshevik, 
socialist, and ethnic political movements, it became clear that the Cossacks and the Bolsheviks 
remained polarized. People found it difficult to make up their minds about the Cossacks. Political 
discussions reflected the belief that the Cossacks, despite their liberal leanings, tended to fall into 
the counterrevolutionary category. “Well, on one hand there are the Bolsheviks,” a non-Cossack 
delegate to the Kiev Cossack Congress mused, “and on the other there are Cossacks.” Another 
 
85 Janke, 283; Andriewsky, 29, 34; Koo, “From an Estate to a Cossack Nation,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol.  
66, no. 10 (2014): 1649-1650; Stevani, 87-88; Wilton, 315; Koo, “Universalizing Cossack Particularism,” 1-2; 
Antonelli, 104; Eliseev, Kornilovskim, 1-2; Denikin, 242, 244; Fedotoff-White, 182-183.  
86 Andriewsky, 35. 
54 
 
member demanded, “So, what are you going to do? Send one bullet into the Bolsheviks and the 
other into the Cossacks? You have to decide.”87   
The Kuban’ Rada demonstrated growing impatience with the state’s vacillation on the 
Bolshevik issue, the delay in calling the Constituent Assembly, and responding to Cossack 
needs.  By the Moscow Conference on August 12, Don Cossack Ataman A. M. Kaledin agreed 
that they needed to develop a united Cossack front to resolve the Cossack question and prevent 
Russians from infringing on Cossack life. Following Kaledin’s lead, the Cossack Council 
decided to make its corporate voice heard. “The time for words has passed,” they declared. “Our 
patience is exhausted. It remains for us to accomplish the great work of salvation.”88 On October 
3, delegates from the Cossack Council met with Vice Premier Aleksandr Konovolev. During the 
meeting, the Cossacks announced that the they wanted to form a separate voting bloc in the 
Constituent Assembly rather than integrate a few delegates into the general elections.89  
 The government agreed. As the state’s authority weakened, Cossack government on the 
Kuban’ strengthened. Under the prerevolutionary form of Cossack self-rule, each voisko district 
had a local administration headed by an ataman. In September, Don, Kuban’, and Terek atamans 
met at Ekaterinodar to develop a strategy to unify South Russia. In the next few days, the Kuban’ 
Rada moved fast. By October 7, they voted to create a sweeping South-East Alliance. The South-
East Union included the Cossack hosts, Caucasian Mountain peoples, and free peoples of the 
steppes (Iugo-vostochnyi soyuz kazach’ikh voisk, gortsev Kavkaza, i vol’nykh narodov stepei). 
The alliance connected the voisko territories bordering the Don region and the North Caucasus in 
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a chain of Cossack republics. Encouraged by the Provisional Government’s declaration that the 
future Russia would function as a republic, the South-East Alliance resolved to protect the 
“healthy parts of the state” stretching from the Don and Kuban’ to the Terek and Astrakhan.90 
Designed to expand Cossack ethnic identity into a nationalist movement, the alliance vowed to 
defend a democratic government, to continue the war with the allies, and fight revolution at 
home. The unification terms guaranteed absolute autonomy to all the nationalities and people 
groups within the alliance regions.91  
 
 The South-East Alliance     
 
This concept of a loose union joining the Cossack voiskos across Russia did not emerge 
for the first time in 1917. During the early twentieth century, Kuban’ Cossack leaders worked 
actively to build the foundations for an independent Cossack state. The South-East Alliance 
aimed to provide a strong legislative and administrative framework to preserve order, combat 
intrusion in local affairs, and to provide a stable political climate to convene the Constituent 
Assembly. The Cossacks believed that only the Constituent Assembly had the power to decide 
the country’s political future. The South-East Alliance played into the concept of Russia’s future 
as a democratic federative republic. Mutually supportive and administratively autonomous, the 
loose territorial union allowed the Cossacks, mountaineers, and steppe peoples to retain complete 
control over their own rule. Rather than forming a single sovereign state, each local government 
remained an independent entity. The union intended to support local administration, legislation, 
and the justice system, while resolving social and economic issues.92 
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The Soyuz alliance, established at the Second Joint Conference in Vladikavkaz, the Terek 
Cossack host’s capital, signaled the Cossacks’ intention to resolve the “Cossack question” for 
themselves while maintaining peripheral government support. After a five-day conference, the 
Cossacks, Caucasians, Kalmyks, and other indigenous peoples agreed to a treaty on October 20. 
The Ural and Orenburg Siberian Cossacks later joined the unification project. The Soyuz then 
moved to legal ratification by the joint governments’ Krug, Rada, and medjilis legislatures. The 
Vladikavkaz treaty fostered support and independence among the Cossacks and their indigenous 
neighbors. The South-East Alliance planned for these independent North Caucasus states to form 
autonomous republics in a future Russian federation.93 
If the unification treaty had succeeded, the Kuban’ Cossacks would have formed one link 
in a chain of federated states that consolidated political administration in local hands. The South-
East Alliance enjoyed widespread local popularity. It demonstrated the Cossack leaders’ 
commitment to their own freedom and unrestricted independence for the diverse people groups 
living in the North Caucasus and left-bank Ukraine. During the Civil War, the anti-Bolsheviks 
refused to acknowledge minority groups as nationalities separate from the Russian state. Anti-
Bolshevik authorities fought bitterly with the Rada to force them to acknowledge General Anton 
Denikin’s supreme leadership over the Cossack host. While the Rada and the Caucasian 
highlanders agreed to withhold grain, oil, and coal from the Soviet north, anti-Bolshevik leaders 
interfered in these efforts with drastic results. Although they continued to explore ways to 
collaborate, cooperation between the Cossacks and the Caucasians became increasingly difficult 
and dangerous. The alliance lasted until destroyed by Soviet occupation in 1920.94   
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During the autumn, the Bolshevik party agitated through rallies, propaganda, and stirring 
up strikes among soldiers, sailors, and workers. As they kept a fragile control on the situation in 
Petrograd, the Cossacks wanted to suppress the Bolshevik threat. Kerensky refused. When a 
group of officers led by Siberian Cossack General Lavr Kornilov urged Kerensky to dissolve the 
soviets, stamp out the Bolshevik revolt, and convene the Constituent Assembly, Kerensky 
imprisoned them as traitors in the Bykhov fortress. Alienated by Kerensky’s treatment, the 
Cossacks turned increasingly insular. Kuban’ leaders pulled away to protect their autonomy. By 
late October, the Rada issued a Kuban’ constitution created by Makarenko. On October 25, the 
same day that the Cossacks elected Ataman Filimonov, the Bolsheviks staged a coup at the 
Winter Palace that overthrew the Provisional Government. In November, the Second All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies legitimized the coup and elected 
Vladimir Lenin to head the new government. The Bolshevik government claimed to exist only 
until the Constituent Assembly voted on the people’s choice for a new administration. Despite 
intimidation tactics, the Bolsheviks failed to gain the popular majority vote at the Constituent 
Assembly on January 19, 1918. In response, the Bolsheviks dissolved the Constituent Assembly. 
The Soviets established a Central Executive Committee in the wake of the Constituent 
Assembly’s dissolution. The Bolshevik power seizure and radical new laws triggered the first 
stirrings of civil war. As an anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army sprang up in Cossack regions in the 
Ukraine, the Soviets hurried to prevent attempts to restore the former Russian Empire.95  
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“You, Kuban’, are Our Motherland”: From a Cossack Sbor to a Cossack State 
 
As the Bolshevik state consolidated power, the tight military administration that 
characterized the Kuban’ Cossack host offered the Kuban’ leaders a political advantage. In the 
early revolutionary days, most Cossacks did not feel an immediate need to secede from Russia. 
At the same time, they moved quickly to elect atamans and establish a central Rada. The Rada 
acted as a congress for the entire Kuban’ population. In the Rada, as in the local assembly, each 
individual had the right to voice his opinion freely. The Bolshevik takeover interfered with the 
South-East Alliance’s plans to provide a stable foundation for the Constituent Assembly and 
ignited Cossack separatist resistance. Faced with estate disintegration, inogorodnye hostility, and 
the opportunity to pursue independence plans, the Cossacks expanded the voisko government 
that previously handled special Cossack affairs into a wider political organization.96    
Three months after the October Revolution, the Soviets abolished private land ownership 
and ordered all propertied classes disarmed to prevent resistance. The new laws also installed 
one Soviet deputy for every one hundred people in stanitsas with populations under 10,000. 
Depending on the Cossack community’s size, the Soviets planted between 3 and 50 Soviet 
deputies per village. The Bolsheviks’ political mouthpiece, Sovnarkom, released a decree “To 
the Entire Nation” that targeted Cossack areas as hostile zones. A month later, the Soviets placed 
the Cossack lands under martial law. The Soviets ordered local commissars to eliminate these 
“enemies of the people” without waiting for orders from above. Following these carte blanche 
guidelines, the Bolsheviks refused to negotiate with captured Cossacks. This hardline policy 
initiated a surge in terror against the Cossacks in the Don and Kuban’ areas. While official 
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Soviet propaganda sought to lure Cossacks to the Bolshevik side, the state’s practical policy 
offered a harsh reality for the Cossack people. Bolshevik decossackization plans proposed to 
enroll Cossacks in the Soviet army, abolish compulsory military service in favor of short-term 
training, provide state-funded uniforms and equipment, eliminate guard duties, military reviews, 
and summer camps, and grant Cossacks the ability to change their place of residence.97   
Despite the military and economic burdens that that the Soviet reforms proposed to lift, 
most Cossacks did not welcome attempts to strip away their military identity. After efforts to 
permanently divide the Cossacks along class lines, the Bolsheviks refused to recognize that their 
solidarity derived from ethnic identity rather than from an artificial estate system. While the 
Soviets saw the Cossacks as capable military opponents, they fought to break the ethnic unity 
that bound the Cossack elite, middle class, and peasants together. In his reports from 1919, Leon 
Trotsky, the commander of the Red Army, admitted that the Cossacks displayed an inconvenient, 
un-Marxist solidarity between working class and nobility. This general unity permeated Cossack 
society at every level. Trotsky interpreted this bond as a reactionary remnant of the estate system 
rather than evidence of ethnic identity. He argued that the Soviets needed to dismantle Cossack 
identity to destroy this commonality and bring Cossack peasants over to the Bolshevik side. A 
popular Soviet leaflet appealing to the “Brother Cossacks!” resulted in comparatively few Red 
Army volunteers. When a Russian inogorodnye publicly insulted the Cossacks during a hot 
debate on land and government in Ekaterinodar in 1917, the cry, “Brother Cossacks!” brought 
every man to his feet. In an act of complete unity, every Kuban’ Cossack filed out of the room.98 
Attempts to divide the Cossacks along class lines and recruit them to the Bolshevik cause largely  
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failed due to a collective ethnic rather than a class-based identity.99    
In an attempt to divert support from the anti-Bolshevik nationalist cause, the Soviets 
offered Russia’s diverse people groups the right to “free self-determination.”100 This encouraged 
national minorities to establish independent states. Despite Soviet promises for self-
determination, Trotsky’s speech to the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets made it clear 
that the Soviets would not permit the Ukraine and North Caucasus to remain autonomous. Both 
regions, Trotsky emphasized, would eventually become part of a federative Soviet republic.101 
The Kuban’ Cossacks already had a separatist state underway. The Kuban’ and Don 
Cossack governments refused to recognize the authority of the Council of People’s Commissars. 
Rather than forming part of a federation of Soviet states as the Bolsheviks hoped, the Kuban’ 
Cossacks fought to secure free government with an embryonic state deeply opposed to Soviet 
authority. In response, the Bolsheviks declared war on the Cossack regions. The Soviets 
commandeered village councils, took over city administration, and increased propaganda to sway 
young Cossack frontoviki exhausted by the war to the Bolshevik side.102     
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Forging their way home through angry crowds and hostile villages, the Cossacks 
maintained strict order and resisted all attempts to disarm them. At train stations, mobs of 
aggressive soldiers tried to engage the Cossacks in revolutionary discussions. The Cossacks 
shied away from them. The widespread social disorder made the Cossacks uneasy, tight-knit, and 
anxious to get home. The Cossack relaxed when he stepped onto Kuban’ earth. His obligations to 
the state fell from his shoulders. Full-fledged Cossack nationalism reasserted itself for the first 
time since the Zaporizhian Hetmanate supported Pugachev’s rebellion.103  
 As war erupted in the Don countryside, anti-Bolshevik generals, officers, and cadets 
gathered a Volunteer Army to liberate Russia. The Soviets developed a Red Army backed by 
industrial power and invaded the south to crush the counterrevolution. In a war along a 
borderless front, the Don Cossacks began the first wave of uprisings that secured their capital at 
Novocherkassk north of Ekaterinodar as a base for military operations.104  
 
The Kuban’ People’s Republic  
 
 
When the Cossacks initiated state-building in late 1917, they revived the remnants of the 
old Cossack Hetmanate government that existed within the Cossack administrative structure into 
the 1840s. The Cossacks’ earlier independence efforts, led by officers from the Cossack nobility, 
paralleled larger nineteenth-century nationalist movements occurring in Poland and Hungary. In 
December, the Cossacks created a dual legislative Rada and Military Council. Rada chairman 
Nikolai S. Ryabovol opened the Military Council’s first session. Ryabovol gripped his listeners 
with strong emotional language and historical memory that reminded the Cossacks how the state 
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sought to use them for its own purposes: “The tsars wanted to make us murderers, they wanted 
that when the convenient time came for the liberation of Ukraine, we would crush that freedom 
with our own hands.”105 The Rada refused to recognize the Bolshevik Council of People’s 
Commissars’ legitimacy or authority. In return, the Soviets outlawed the Kuban’ as an insurgent 
region. Two days after the Rada proclaimed its constitution, Trotsky sent the Red Army south to 
“wipe off the face of the earth the counterrevolutionary rebellion of the Cossack Generals.”106 
The Kuban’ Rada remained the only effective governing body in the area. Since the 
Cossacks pursued state-building in an ethnically and politically heterogeneous region, each 
group’s goals complicated the Rada’s reform movements. On third of Kuban’ industry and half 
of the North Caucasus’ small proletarian population lived in Ekaterinodar. The Kuban’s key 
social and economic problem centered on land. The Rada soon found its attempts at internal 
stabilization and reform impeded by nonresident demands. Despite the Cossacks’ and Russian 
settlers’ complicated relationship, the Rada extended the right to vote both to the Caucasian 
mountain peoples and the inogorodnye. The Rada also promulgated a reform program that 
included non-Cossacks and expanded some of their rights.107  
In Ekaterinodar, the Bolsheviks and the inogorodnye dominated local soviet councils. 
The Bolsheviks ran propaganda in local newspapers during regional elections while Mensheviks 
and Social Revolutionaries jockeyed to create an anti-Bolshevik bloc. Fueled by their success in 
the Executive Committee, the Soviets demanded that each worker receive 14 acres in the 
countryside. Workers would live on the land rent-free. The Soviets expanded their revolutionary 
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utopia to stipulate that workers no longer had to pay for housing, water, overdue rents, or other 
unpaid bills. Instead, the “nonworking” middle class would cover these expenses.108  
The Cossacks recognized that the inogorodnye deserved to have a voice in local affairs, 
but political polarization and the land rights conflict sowed seeds of division along anti-
Bolshevik and pro-Soviet lines. Encouraged by the upheaval, the nonresidents stopped paying 
rent and demanded that the Cossacks surrender the land to them. The inogorodnye also called for 
the abolishment of Cossack land and tax privileges. The mood grew threatening and the 
relationship spiraled. Initially conciliatory, the Cossacks began to fear a true democratic process 
that would allow the inogorodnye to run over them. At local meetings, Soviets and nonresidents 
cheered Lenin and Trotsky. Others shouted that the Cossacks drank the proletarians’ blood. The 
Cossacks also grew excited, interrupted the nonresidents, and called for recesses when a vote did 
not go their way. When a nonresident attacked Makarenko for maliciously resisting the zemstvo, 
Sultan Shakhim-Girei, leading the Caucasian delegates, sprang to defend Makarenko. After a 
three-day debate, the quarreling members broke up into smaller groups to try to come up with a 
plan to develop a viable local administration. The outsiders’ demand for land socialization drove 
the Circassians to side with the Cossacks. In the Don region, relations between the Cossacks and 
nonresidents shifted between empathy and hostility. At Vladikavkaz, the Terek Cossacks and the 
inogorodnye joined forces in a full-scale war against the Ingush and Chechen peoples.109     
The war in the Kuban’ emerged primarily between the Cossacks and the nonresidents. 
Since nonresident partisans attacked Cossack villages, some Rada members wanted to expel or 
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execute suspected Bolshevik inogorodnye. The Rada president, L. L. Bych, toned the meeting 
down and made it clear that the government would not deport or kill anyone. At the same time, 
the Cossacks voted to ensure that only Cossack children attended stanitsa schools.110   
As local Soviet power swelled, social destabilization and property seizure appeared 
imminent. The Rada decided to root out the Bolshevik threat from the district. Appealing to the 
First Caucasian Native Cavalry Division for support, the Cossacks, Mensheviks, and Social 
Revolutionaries united in a massive effort to eject the Bolsheviks from the capital. On the night 
of November 1, the Cossacks and supporting forces disarmed the Soviets throughout the city. 
Then, on February 16, the Rada declared the Kuban’ People’s Republic a free state.111   
By late winter, the Don capital at Novocherkassk and the Rostov center fell into 
Bolshevik hands. Forced to retreat, the Volunteer White Army under generals Lavr Kornilov, 
Mikhail Alexeev, and Anton Denikin fought their way south through icy and volatile conditions 
to reach the Kuban’. The road between Rostov and Novocherkassk dissolved. Harassed and 
outnumbered, the Volunteer Army broke through to the North Caucasus. At the border to the 
Kuban’, the Don Cossacks under General Piotr Popov refused to enter the Kuban’ Cossacks’ 
sovereign territory. On the struggle south, the Volunteers did not know if the Kuban’ Cossacks 
would support them. Even before the Volunteer Army reached the Kuban’, Rada president L. L. 
Bych warned the Cossacks that joining the Whites would result in subjection to a military 
dictatorship. He urged the Cossacks to defend their own land rather than joining the larger anti-
Bolshevik movement that would subject them to outside control and result in a “new absorption 
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of the Kuban’ by Russia.”112 When the Volunteers broke through Bolshevik lines to the Kuban’, 
most Cossacks viewed them as intruders. Others welcomed them cautiously.113 
Before the start of spring planting season, the Bolsheviks plunged into the Kuban’. “Our  
offensive,” Trotsky acknowledged, “put the whole Cossack population on their feet.”114 A 
Kuban’ Cossack colonel led an uprising in the Ryu stanitsa near Taman on the Sea of Azov. 
Moving quickly to meet the Bolshevik advance, Cossack riders crossed the Kerch Strait and 
strung out along the Kuban’ border. At Cossack headquarters in Simferopol, a handful of 
horsemen and a partial plastun division equipped with only a few weapons also prepared to meet 
the enemy. “Armed with God,” a sympathetic Russian observed, the small Cossack force drew 
on their own military experience and strategies passed down from their Zaporizhian ancestors to 
appear like a fully fortified outpost.115 Fighting until pushed back into the mountains, Cossack 
units briefly created a buffer zone between the Kuban’ and the blazing Don lands.116   
The Red Army broke through the Cossack lines. They flowed into the Kuban’, seizing 
Ekaterinodar, setting up revolutionary tribunals, and executing 1,600 people. On March 13, 
1918, the Kuban’ government fled the capital. By early spring, the Red Army encircled the 
province. This move allowed the Bolsheviks to gain a revolutionary foothold and establish four 
federated Soviet republics in the area. Ignoring the fact that the majority of the local people 
remained hostile, the Soviets established the North Caucasus Soviet Republic at Ekaterinodar.117  
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Few Cossacks initially welcomed the Volunteers. Disheartened by the White Army’s 
small numbers and fearing Bolshevik reprisals, the Cossacks neither fought nor joined them. 
When the Whites appeared at the Khomutovghaya stanitsa on the Kuban’ border, Kornilov 
called the Cossacks into the village square. He appealed for help and explained how they planned 
to drive the Bolsheviks from the Kuban’. Stirred by his speech, a number of Cossacks joined up. 
In the mountains near Nekrassovskaya, Cossacks hiding in the Circassian villages gathered 
rapidly under Ivan G. Erdeli, Viktor L. Pokrovsky, and Andrei Shkuro. Each unit merged to join 
other Cossacks operating in the area. The fighting turned mobile and ferocious, following old 
North Caucasian patterns in guerilla warfare. Trying to locate the Cossack forces, the Volunteers 
pursued each new rumor from village to valley at lightning speed. By early March, the Whites 
found the Cossacks who had overran the Bolsheviks in a complete victory at Shendji.118      
The Bolshevik grip on local power shook the Kuban’ government. Returning from the 
hills, the Rada agreed to cooperate with the army. Caught between Red terror and White 
pressure, the Cossacks signed a Kuban’-Volunteer agreement. Determined to help the Cossacks 
throw the Bolsheviks out of the North Caucasus, Kornilov launched an attack on the heavily 
defended capital. When Kornilov died in the attack, Denikin took command, evacuated the 
Kuban’, and returned to the Donbas. At Mechetinskaya, the Rada members accompanying them 
refused to enter the Don area. They respected the border as a separate region and returned to 
stabilize their own territory. By August 2, the army recaptured Ekaterinodar. From this base, the 
troops gradually swept the North Caucasus free from Bolshevik power.119 
Critical problems between the Volunteer leadership’s unification goals and Cossack 
independence soon emerged. The new Volunteer Army commander believed absolutely in the 
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Russian state’s indivisibility. “A Russia cut into bits cannot exist,” Denikin maintained.120 
Convinced that the anti-Soviet struggle would ignite a widespread nationalist movement to save 
Russia, Denikin clashed fiercely with the leaders of the borderland separatist nationalities. Two 
governments, the Volunteer Army and the Rada, emerged in Ekaterinodar. When the Cossacks 
joined the Volunteer Army to liberate the Kuban’, the collaboration signaled the start of a 
symbiotic but troubled relationship between the Rada and the anti-Bolshevik army.121 
 
Volya or Samostiinost’: Cossack Separatism and the Anti-Bolshevik Armies 
 
 Nationalism served as a cohesive means to fight the Bolsheviks for the minority 
movements that emerged in the collapse of central authority in Russia. For the Kubantsy, the 
question centered on whether the political future offered an indivisible or a federated Russia. The 
centrist ideology expressed by Denikin’s increasingly obsessive motto, “Russia, One and 
Indivisible,” did not appeal to the Cossacks. When the Kuban’ government returned to 
Ekaterinodar in August, the Rada resumed its plans for a republic based on popular will. The 
more that the White leadership tried to subjugate the Cossacks, the more the Rada refused to 
submit to a military dictatorship. Heated discussions ensued between Cossack separatist leaders 
and White Army representatives. The Volunteer leadership demanded that the Cossacks submit 
to their authority but failed to offer any compromise to render this acceptable.122 
The Kuban’ Rada worked hard to ensure that their state would have a place in a future 
autonomous Russian federation. The Cossacks clung to their belief in their right to an 
independent statehood. Cossack volya, rooted in the will of the people, clashed with the army 
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leadership’s dedication to a united, and as the Cossacks feared, an autocratic Russia. Convinced 
that Cossack autonomy undermined White goals and authority, Denikin and General Piotr  
Wrangel, among others, criminalized Cossack separatism as samostiinost’, or treason.123  
 Although White Army officers’ personal political views ranged from monarchist and 
social democratic to republican or the liberal Kadet party, the Volunteer Army leadership often 
demonstrated autocratic tendencies. Denikin viewed self-determination as Russian statehood’s 
collapse. He argued that all must unite to destroy the Bolsheviks. In a period filled with emerging 
minority groups and ethnic nationalist identities, Denikin rejected self-rule as illegitimate and 
treasonous. The Russians viewed the Cossacks as little more than a military estate, created by 
and for the state, rather than a preexisting ethnicity. Over five centuries since their early 
Zaporizhian roots, the Cossacks evolved through their unique dialect, military and social culture, 
and democratic socio-political system into a distinct ethnic group.124   
The Kuban’ Cossacks’ ethnic differences, rejection of authority imposed on them without 
election or choice, and their development into a political entity collided with the anti-Bolsheviks’ 
vision for a cohesive Russian nation. At first, Denikin stepped carefully. He feared alienating the 
Cossacks too soon and losing their support. The Rada proved willing to work with Denikin to 
expel the Bolsheviks. At the same time, they felt that Denikin’s attempts to subject the Rada to 
his authority threatened the Republic’s sovereignty. While the Rada did not deny Denikin’s 
authority in the military sphere, they continually defended their Cossack rights against Russian 
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control. Refusing to submit politically to the concept of a unified Russian state, the Cossacks 
remained committed to the idea of a free Kuban’.125  
 Since Kuban’ Cossack resistance focused on driving the Bolsheviks from the North 
Caucasus, they formed the backbone for the Volunteer Army, later called the Armed Forces of 
South Russia. Despite their commitment to the anti-Bolshevik cause, the Cossacks angered 
White leadership by insisting on self-rule and seeking statehood recognition from the Allies. 
Until they wiped out the Bolshevik threat from the Kuban’, the Rada declared that they would 
maintain a defensive stance to insulate their lands. Meanwhile, the Volunteer Army continued to 
assert a growing demand for men, food, and supplies over the region.126 
With their Balachka dialect, ties to the Ukraine, and distrust for Russian authority, the 
Black Sea Kuban’ Cossacks swung further to the political left than the Russian-speaking Terek 
Cossacks. Although Terek Cossack Ataman Filimonov headed the Military Council, the 
chornovtsy had a larger population than the lineetsy. As a result, the Black Sea Cossacks had 
greater voice in regional politics and dominated the Rada. The Cossacks’ separatist impulses 
alarmed the White generals. They considered the concurrent Ukrainian independence movement 
as destructive as communism for Russia. As a result, the Volunteer Army refused to 
acknowledge either the Ukrainians or Cossacks as separate people groups.127 
The White leadership preferred the limited autonomy ideas held by the Terek Cossacks 
over the separatists’ vision for a federated republic. As Military Council head, Filimonov usually 
stayed quiet on the separatist topic to avoid alienating the regular Cossacks in the Volunteer 
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forces. The new White Army constitution, designed to delineate the army’s and Rada’s spheres 
of power, highlighted the incompatibility of Cossack and anti-Bolshevik politics. The moderate 
White politicians and the lineetsy agreed that the Whites needed to respect the wishes of the 
popular majority and offer a compelling alternative to the Soviet government. Recognizing that 
the Kuban’ Cossacks would not freely accept a military dictatorship, the Whites under Denikin 
and General Mikhail Dragomirov crafted a constitution that threw in phrases such as 
“federation” to appease the Cossacks and disguise the authors’ real goals. The Denikinites hoped 
to lull Cossack suspicions while transferring military authority, foreign policy, financial, 
economic, and communication administration into White hands. The federation phrases did not 
deceive the Rada. They recognized that the proposed constitution echoed the prerevolutionary 
estate structure by offering only limited local autonomy. Kuban’ separatists led by L. L. Bych 
rejected the Denikin constitution in a unified show of solidarity. Instead, they offered to draw up 
a new constitution. They never had the chance to submit it.128   
Despite mutual misunderstandings and incompatibilities, the Cossack leaders went in 
person to meet with Denikin to propose changes to the constitution. The general declined to 
discuss the situation but notified them that he intended to address the Rada. This alarmed the 
Cossacks, who feared that Denikin planned to assert a dictatorship on the spot. After attending a 
solemn church service, the Cossacks, Whites, and nonresident members walked over to the 
Rada’s assembly hall in the Winter Theater to continue the discussion in a public forum. When 
Ryabolov offered Denikin the floor, he rose up from his theater box and circled the Rada 
members. The 8th Kuban’ Cossack regiment shifted and looked prepared to protect its leaders. 
Mounting the stage, Denikin launched into a passionate speech glorifying Russian nationalism 
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and criminalizing Cossack autonomy. He called on the “glorious Cossacks” to shed their “holy 
blood” to recreate Russia by supporting a unified state ideology.129 In the same breath, Denikin 
rejected the Rada’s desire for a home defense army. Instead, the Cossacks must serve in the 
Russian army under a single supreme commander. “Do not play with fire,” Denikin warned. The 
Cossacks could not insulate the Kuban’. If they did not unite to liberate Russia from the Soviets, 
then the Kuban’ would fall to Bolshevik control. Finally, Denikin forbid the Rada to represent 
the Kuban’ People’s Republic as a separate nation at the upcoming Paris Peace Conference.130   
When Denikin turned to exit the building, Ryabolov invited him to stay and listen to the 
rest of the meeting. In the vigorous discussion that followed, most Cossacks felt pressured and 
discouraged by Denikin’s speech. The Kuban’ leaders insisted that they answered to the people 
rather than to the Volunteer Army. Since the Cossacks did not elect Denikin, they refused to 
acknowledge his absolute authority. Finally, P.M. Kaplin dressed in a cherkesska with dagger, 
exclaimed, “Have mercy, all this is indefinite.”131 He explained that the Whites would never 
recognize Cossack rights. He argued that they needed to resolve the question at the Constituent 
Assembly. Even N. S. Dogopolov, an inogorodnye delegate, understood the Cossacks’ love for 
democracy. Overall, the inogorodnye members felt reassured. In fact, the nonresidents felt so 
comfortable that they flooded into the Regional Council. Gradually, the Whites persuaded the 
nonresidents to support them against the Rada. When the Regional Council continued to disrupt 
meetings with attacks on the Rada, the government shut it down.132  
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Forming a Kuban’ Army to insulate their borders and exercise leadership over their own 
troops had appealed to Cossack leaders since autumn 1917. Since the Don Army retained a 
separate existence, it only deployed on the Don front. The preservation of the Don Army’s 
integrity encouraged the Rada that creating a First Kuban’ Army lay in reach. Because the 
presence of most of their troops at the front stripped the Kuban’ of defenses, the Rada negotiated 
to withdraw some troops to create a Kuban’ Army. The Whites refused. Denikin and Wrangel, 
commanding the First Caucasian Army, saw the request as an attempt to decentralize authority 
and pull crucial Kuban’ units back from the front. The Military Council held a moderate 
position. Neither supporting nor condemning the separatists, Filimonov shifted into a neutral 
space while the Rada and Denikinites clashed over his head. Although throttled by red tape, the 
Rada dragged its feet on sending more troops north to advance on Moscow. When Wrangel 
realized that the Rada delayed sending reinforcements because the Whites ignored their requests 
for a Kuban’ Army, he confronted them at Ekaterinodar. Kuban’ Cossack General Vyacheslav G. 
Naumenko, a cool-headed and charismatic combat officer, left the front lines to act as a 
negotiator between Wrangel and the Rada. At the meeting, the Kuban’ members agreed to send 
troops once Denikin agreed to their request. The Whites retorted that the Rada had no one 
capable to command an independent army. “But we are not asking that,” Naumenko clarified 
calmly. He explained that Wrangel, a popular, non-Cossack officer, already commanded the 
Caucasian Army. The Rada felt satisfied if Wrangel chose to lead the Kuban’ Army. This action 
would transfer both the Caucasian Army’s troops and ability to control them from Denikin to the 
Kuban’ government. Turning on Naumenko, Wrangel threatened to dissolve the Rada if they 
elected him head of the Kuban’ Army. The meeting broke up in silence.133   
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The problem remained that the Volunteer Army had largely become a Kuban’ Cossack 
army under Russian leadership. Due to heavy reliance on the Cossacks, the Denikin faction 
refused to allow the Rada military or administrative powers that would reduce the Whites’ 
control and depopulate field forces to cover regional defenses. The Rada continued to refuse to 
bow to Denikin’s authority but stopped short of pulling Cossack units out of the army. Filimonov 
resigned during the crisis. The new ataman, Didatom Lintsev, also favored separatism and a 
regional army. The controversy over creating a First Kuban’ Army reflected a growing inability 
on either side to enact compromises to achieve a beneficial result.134 
Tensions escalated between Denikin and the Rada. By early autumn, the separatists 
openly publicized the need for an inviolable Cossack land completely separate from Russia. The 
Kuban’ government developed a free press called the “Kuban’sky krai” in their local Balachka 
dialect. The newspaper fervently promoted Cossack nationalism and supported the concurrent 
Ukrainian patriotic movement. Between 1918 and 1919, the Rada took steps to establish friendly 
relations with the Ukrainian Hetmanate government that sought independence from Russia. Over 
the next few months, Kuban’ leaders debated the advisability about annexing Kuban’ to the 
Ukraine. On January 4, 1919, twenty-nine political parties and organizations met at the 
Ukrainian Black Sea Council to approve the action. While direct descendants of the Zaporizhian 
Cossacks voted to join forces with Ukraine, others remained undecided on the best option. The 
Cossacks not only felt kinship with the Ukraine, but they needed political allies and military 
armaments. Ryabovol negotiated with the Hetmanate to provide them with weapons from 
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Russian wartime stockpiles held in warehouses in Kiev. By November, the Ukrainian 
government officially recognized the Kuban’ Cossacks as an ethnic minority group.135    
Days after the Ukrainian secretary spoke about goodwill between the Kuban’ and the 
Ukrainian people at the Rada assembly, White agents arrested him without explanation. Security 
forces tore down the blue and yellow flag and ransacked the Ukrainian embassy house quartered 
near the Rada headquarters. On a cold Valentine’s Day night in February 1919, an armed White 
detachment also halted the Ukrainian ambassador Fedir K. Borzhynskyi’s train near Volnovakha. 
Borzhynskyi, a tall, gentle man with a long Zaporizhian mustache, had just returned from 
Ekaterinodar where he vigorously supported Kuban’ independence. After a hasty night trial, 
White intelligence agents took Borzhynskyi to the town outskirts and shot him for treason to 
Russia. The Volunteer Army promptly annulled the Kuban’-Ukrainian union.136   
 
The Autonomous Republic of Mountain Peoples 
 
The year 1919 began badly for the Kuban’ government. P. S. Shushkov, a Denikin 
protégé, headed the Rada. By May, the Shushkov faction resigned. Then a new round of 
elections gave the separatist Cossacks an overwhelming majority. Every local Cossack assembly 
voted for separatist leaders and Kuban’ independence. General N. A. Bukretov, a key Denikin 
critic, became Rada ataman. The Rada chose Ryabolov, the Kuban’-Ukraine alliance leader, as 
the second Rada chairman next to Bych. Denikin supporters responded by offering D. I. 
Litovkin, the sole White Army representative, as an alternative candidate. In typical democratic 
fashion, the Cossacks pointed out they could not overthrow a duly elected president. The 
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Cossacks voiced their fear that Denikin’s rule demonstrated all the characteristics of a 
dictatorship. They insisted that the Cossacks should fight autocracy as stubbornly as they resisted 
bolshevism. The Kuban’ leaders proved too outspoken. As Ryabolov opened negotiations with 
Ukraine to land supporting troops in the Kuban’, White intelligence rapidly uncovered the 
ongoing Kuban’-Ukrainian plans. At the South-Ukrainian Union conference on June 13, 1919, 
Ryabolov openly criticized the Denikin regime. Hours later, Ryabolov was dead.137    
The murder of the Rada chairman dealt a devastating blow to the Kuban’ separatists. As 
he entered the Palace Hotel in Rostov, Ryabolov took two shots to the back of his head. His 
assassins, identified as White agents by witnesses, escaped. Ryabolov’s death remained a stark 
symbol of the lengths to which the Russians would go to destroy Cossack autonomy. During that 
summer, they retaliated against the separatists with a burst of terror. On the night of May 8, 
White agents narrowly missed killing anti-zemstvo activist Makarenko. The assassination plot 
succeeded against Kondrat L. Bardizh, the Cossack Minister of the Interior and supporter for 
equal Cossack and nonresident rights.138 
The Cossack struggle for a free Kuban’ resonated from the borderlands to Western 
Europe. Despite their distant location in the North Caucasus, the Rada leaders remained well 
informed about political trends and events in Europe. Above all, the Kuban’ Cossacks wanted to 
establish a legitimate republic recognized by their European allies. They eagerly supported 
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American president Woodrow Wilson’s concepts that affirmed the “right of small nations to self-
determination.”139 In discussions with White leadership and British Mission members, the 
Kuban’ government expressed its desire to abide by international law.140  
The Kuban’ leaders began negotiations with the mountain medjilis to join the  
Autonomous Republic of Mountain Peoples. Like the South-East Union, this loosely federated 
alliance supported self-determination among the North Caucasus people groups. The alliance 
demonstrated that the Cossacks saw themselves more closely aligned with the indigenous 
mountain peoples than with Russia. In autumn 1919, Kuban’ Cossack politicians joined the 
Russian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. At the conference, the Cossacks appealed to 
the allies for statehood recognition. The western delegates, who saw little political, economic, or 
military benefit in supporting a small independent republic against the main anti-Bolshevik 
forces, chose to remain neutral. The Cossacks saw that they must save themselves. They turned 
again to the Caucasus for support. In an overlooked episode at the Paris Peace Conference, L. L. 
Bych, Alexei I. Kulabukov, and several other Kuban’ leaders signed a treaty with the Mountain 
Republic of the Peoples of the North Caucasus. The agreement sought mutual solidarity, 
acknowledgement of the minority peoples’ rights to self-rule, gradual withdrawal of  
supplies and support from Denikin, and the “full independence of the Kuban’.”141  
The intense political climate swung into punitive violence. When Denikin and Wrangel  
discovered that the Kuban’ delegates signed a separate treaty at the Paris Peace conference, they  
ordered a coup against the Rada. On November 6, General Pokrovsky and his troops surrounded 
the Rada at the Winter Theater. He demanded that the conservative members throw thirty-three 
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separatists out to them. In the chaos, several Kuban’ Cossacks jumped out the window. The 
excited soldiers killed one man on the spot. The others escaped. Then Pokrovsky called out the 
names of the most wanted men.142 
Denikin ordered all the Kuban’ signers arrested and brought before him in a field court. 
Furious that the Cossacks appealed to the Allies for state recognition, Denikin determined to 
make an example to stamp out the independence movement. On November 7, a drumhead court-
martial condemned Kulabukhov, a popular Cossack priest, to death. Within hours, the Whites 
hanged Kulabukhov in the street in Ekaterinodar. A sign dangling around his neck read, 
“Treason to the Motherland and the Cossacks.” The execution of an amiable, intelligent, and 
respected priest sparked anger and terror among the Cossack population. Denikin’s treatment 
created the desired effect. The remaining diplomatic delegation, fearing mass execution, could 
not return to the Kuban’. Makarenko, a key pro-Ukrainian Kuban’ separatist and outspoken 
Denikin opponent, slipped through the White cordon and escaped to the Terek Line.143  
The visceral response that Ryabolov’s murder and Kulabukhov’s execution provoked 
among the Cossacks at the front demonstrated the extent to which ordinary Cossacks supported 
the separatists. The coup against the Rada stirred up bitterness among many Kuban’ Cossacks in 
the Volunteer Army. Street fighting broke out in Ekaterinodar on the night of November 12. 
Cossacks cut railway communication between Denikin and the Black Sea coast. In the Rada, the 
remaining Cossacks threatened to stop all supplies to the White Army. After crushing the 
separatist movement leaders, the Whites quickly elected a new, more submissive puppet Rada.144  
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The Whites tried to eradicate Cossack autonomy by military force. Since they refused to 
accept that the Cossack majority preferred to rule themselves, the anti-Bolsheviks argued that the 
Kuban’ separatists represented only a small percentage from the Cossack population. White 
leadership represented the separatists as a minority group of troublemakers imposing their radical 
beliefs on the majority. Local Cossack assemblies not only voted overwhelmingly for self-
determination but to force a minority will on the people fundamentally violated Cossack ethics. 
Each time that the White leadership attempted to subordinate the Rada to a military dictatorship, 
the separatists argued that they answered only to the people. To recognize that the Cossacks’ 
core political outlook centered on the right to self-determination would have forced the Whites to 
admit that the Cossacks identified as a separate ethnos rather than as an indivisible Russian 
nation. If the Denikinites acknowledged that their centrist policies went against the popular will, 
then this would have forced them to consider self-rule’s legitimacy. Admitting that ethnic 
minorities had the right to choose their own government undermined the Whites’ attempts to 
reconstruct a monolithic Russian state. Discouraged by their leaders’ fate, the Kuban’ Cossacks, 
who made up seventy percent of the Caucasian Amy, began to desert. Many returned to their 
villages rather than continue to fight the Volunteer Army’s war that seemed as intent on fighting 
the Bolsheviks as on recreating a central Russian state.145  
 Despite their conflicted relationship, the Cossacks remained a significant asset to  
the anti-Bolshevik forces. The White leadership valued the Cossacks’ organization, unity, and 
fighting power. As a result, they resorted to coercive measures to control and direct Cossack 
military strength. By December, remaining Cossack leaders placed the hosts’ administration 
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under Denikin’s control. In early 1920, a High Krug met to unite the Don, Kuban’, and Terek 
voiskos. Separatist echoes resurfaced when the delegates crafted the agreement. After a hot 
debate, the council removed the word “Russia” from the oath. On March 17, the Reds captured 
Ekaterinodar. The Rada escaped to Novorossiysk where the Kuban’ People’s Republic ceased to 
exist. Even without a political leader, envisioned by some as the People’s Republic and by others 
as a “Cossack Tsar,” the Kuban’ remained a center of revolt.146  
Morning mist flooded the Kuban’. In the square on the western edge of a Cossack village, 
a black cloud of horses massed together. The horses shifted under riders with tense faces, 
shashkas tucked into their belts, and Berdianka rifles slung across their backs. Around them, the 
village lay asleep. Cutting through the sotnias, the colonel greeted his men quietly. The hundreds 
closed around him. As the line began to move, men slipped into their yards to tell their wives 
goodbye. Some drank fresh milk cold from the cellar in a last taste of home that lingered with 
them as the column moved out of the village towards the enemy. “With God, after me,” the 
officer said softly. “With God!” the Cossacks replied. Beyond the village, in a hollow curved 
into the Kuban’ land, the detachment halted. Looking into his men’s faces, the colonel explained 
their orders. Each Cossack’s natural experience in swift, shifting, and irregular tactics applied to 
the fight against the Bolsheviks. The enemy could hide behind rocks, lie in gullies, and skulk on 
village borders. Warning them not to smoke, since the thin blue haze could alert Soviet partisans, 
the officer gave the order to ride. The Cossacks flowed in a mass into the wild steppe.147  
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Chapter IV 
 
 
Resistance 
 
 
“They Fight Any Power, or Regime, or Idea” 
 
 
North Caucasus: Spring 1918 
 
 
At dawn, church bells ringing violently brought armed Kuban’ Cossacks into the village 
square. They poured in to find a strange ataman watching them from a sleek Kabarda horse. The 
tall Cossack officer, with a dark mustache in a lean face, wore a karakul wool hat over his eyes 
and a rifle slung across his shoulder. Nikita Podymov spoke quickly and intensely to the crowd. 
His call to liberate Russia from the “hated Red power” stirred the Cossacks into action. His 
charismatic persona made him a rebel leader that the Cossacks wanted to follow. One hundred 
men joined his force on the spot. Ataman Podymov ignited a local resistance movement that 
spread with every stanitsa that they passed. Cossack units fanned out into the mountains as the 
Volunteers struggled across a freezing Kuban’ River to meet them. For the next five years, in the 
space between the Cossack struggle for independence and the Whites’ shifting grip on territorial 
power, the conflict in the North Caucasus often unfolded as an atamans’ war.148 
Since the October Revolution, the Don and Kuban’ fronts formed a strategic 
counterrevolutionary haven. As anti-Bolshevik movements stirred in early 1918, these regions 
emerged as centers of revolt. The Soviets represented the Bolshevik coup as a people’s 
revolution and the Soviet state as a popular government. In reality, the Bolsheviks remained a 
political minority backed by utopian promises, deliberate tactics, and a solid worker and 
conscripted peasant base. By spring 1918, Bolshevik troops hurried to destroy the remnants of 
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the Russian Imperial Army merging in the Cossack territories. As counterrevolution rose in the 
south, the Civil War that ensued became in many ways a war against the Cossacks.149 
The Cossack resistance movements in the early twentieth-century Kuban’ can be viewed 
less in the context of regular military forces engaging in civil war than a massive liberation effort 
to repel Russian invasion. In contrast to common interpretations that mark the Civil War from 
the Ice March to the last stand at Perekop in 1920, the anti-Soviet struggle did not conform to the 
neat historical boundaries of organized war. When Wrangel’s beaten forces scrambled out of the 
Crimea, they left behind a Kuban’ in flames. With the Rada destroyed and its military support 
exiled or dead, the Kuban’ Cossacks fled into the hills to escape Bolshevik terror. They carried 
on an obscure existence as anti-Bolshevik insurgents. Outlawed as bandits, the Cossacks 
assassinated local Soviet leaders in attempts to free or avenge their families. “They care nothing 
for Russia,” observed an American officer during the Civil War. “They fight any power, or 
regime, or idea that interferes with their old privileges.”150 White partisans operated in the North 
Caucasus until at least 1926. Despite decossackization, deportation, and collectivization, the 
shadowy concept of a free Kuban’ existed in Cossack collective consciousness until they rose up 
against the Soviets again with devastating consequences during the Second World War.151   
Despite pro-Soviet partisans operating in the North Caucasus, the Kuban’ largely 
represented an anti-Bolshevik region that the Red Army endeavored to subdue and secure for the 
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next several years. When Bolshevik commissars formed governments at Sevastopol and Taman 
on the Black Sea coast and then declared the area Sovietized, the Cossacks repeatedly forced the 
Bolsheviks out. The North Caucasian Red Army and the Taman Red Army, composed largely 
from the nonresidents, presented a continual threat to Cossack villages as the Volunteer Army 
diverted Cossack troops away from the Kuban’ on northern offensives.152  
When the Bolsheviks pressed into the North Caucasus, the Kuban’ rose. At first, Cossack 
communities feared Red reprisals. Many also viewed the Whites as intruders. Slow at first, the 
resistance movement gathered momentum, according to one Cossack officer, “like a ball of snow 
rolling down a mountain.”153 At each battle, Cossacks drafted by the Reds quickly surrendered to 
the Whites. Cossack units already operated in the hills. When the Volunteers started conscripting 
from Kuban’ stanitsas, the Cossacks joined regular army units since they did not have their own 
Kuban’ army. Some dropped out as soon as the army moved away from their villages. Although 
many Cossacks kept fighting with the army once they secured the North Caucasus, tensions 
remained between the Whites’ national goals and the Cossacks’ regional concerns.154  
The Cossacks formed the backbone of the Volunteer Army. Morale surged to new heights 
as volunteers fled south to join the White Army. By June, they reached 9,000. Kuban’ Cossacks 
composed half of this number. The massive effort carried them on a crest of victories as they  
moved into the Ukraine and lower Volga regions and poised to take Moscow.155  
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At the start of the Civil War in 1918, the Don centers at Rostov and Novocherkassk 
controlled the railway line that ran down to the North Caucasus. Uniting Cossack resistance in 
the Kuban’ and isolating local Bolsheviks from mainland Soviet power meant that the Cossacks 
initially had some potential to prevent external invasion. Since the Kuban’ Cossack host 
represented around 1,340,000 or 46% of the total Kuban’ population, insulating themselves from 
an internal enemy proved impossible. It meant that the Cossacks attempted to guard a territory 
interspersed with Soviet partisans who engaged them in a savage guerilla war. The Cossacks’ 
military organization, solidarity, and peripheral location imbued their leaders with the belief that 
they could halt an external danger at the Kuban’ border. This ultimately proved impossible.156 
 
War of Annihilation  
 
Despite forays into the Don and campaigns that launched pincer-movement thrusts north 
towards Moscow, much of the Cossack war played out on the North Caucasus front. By late 
1918, the White Army had more conscripted members than volunteers. Most of its fighting 
power lay in its heavy Kuban’ Cossack base. As military professionals, the Cossacks protected 
the army’s rear and sliced through larger Red Army forces. The Whites crossed railroads, took 
armored trains, and fought from the stanitsas Mirskaya and Lezhanka to Mechetenskaya and 
Mikhailovskaya. Kuban’ units also shifted north in a campaign that penetrated deep into Red 
territory. The Bolsheviks observed that the Volunteers moved offensively while the Cossacks 
generally fought defensively to protect their own regions. The separatist Rada, locked in a battle 
for autonomy with Denikin, recognized that these northward movements stripped defense forces 
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from their communities. Until 1920, the White leadership denied Cossack leaders’ requests to 
form a Kuban’ Army since this would detach units to create regional defense positions and 
hinder the army’s main objective to retake central Russia.157  
The war for the Kuban’ scorched through Cossack villages. The Soviets recognized that 
the Cossack population generally remained hostile to the Bolsheviks. In the confused, violent, 
and unstable civil war atmosphere, ordinary people fell victim to both Red terror policies and 
White revenge. The Soviets gave the Cheka, the secret police force that specialized in mass 
terror, free rein to liquidate the Cossacks as state enemies. The North Caucasian Red Army and 
the Taman Red Army unleashed a reign of terror on the Kuban’. The Reds attacked stanitsas 
without warning, shouting, “Death to the Cossacks!” They set fire to houses, stables, and grain. 
Women and children fled into the steppe. In one village, a few officers and old Cossacks stayed 
to fight. As the Reds burst into the church square, gunfire erupted from behind fences and 
outbuildings. The first shots took down the Red commander. Officers with St. George crosses 
swinging from their chests fought multiple Reds simultaneously, while old men picked Soviets 
off with hunting rifles from their yards. At night, surviving villagers crept back to burned homes 
and dead relatives. When the Volunteer Army returned to the Donbas in spring 1918, the  
Cossacks unleashed their fury on the Reds that terrorized their villages in their absence.158  
The war turned into a community struggle. As Soviet units entered first the Don and then 
the Kuban Cossack communities, the Cossacks that had not previously mobilized turned against 
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them. Every man in the villages at Veshenskaya, Migulinskaya, and Kazanskaya rose up, 
“swearing never to surrender.”159 Young Cossack women with no formal military training rode 
out to the front with their brothers. The effective community mobilization gave Denikin the 
backing that he needed to use Cossack cavalry and British tanks to maneuver to a serious 
advantage in 1918 and 1919. The uprisings forced the Bolsheviks to grudgingly recognize, as 
they ferociously put down the revolts, that they had a genuine “people’s war” on their hands.160    
As Denikin moved back south to attack Ekaterinodar, the Kuban’ Cossacks fought closer 
to regaining their capital. Kuban’ General Skhuro captured Stavropol on July 15. When Denikin 
hurled troops in to throw off the Red counterattack, the Red Cossack Ivan Sorokin smashed into 
Denikin’s rear. The White lines failed to break. By August 7, the Reds retreated back into 
Ekaterinodar. Within a week, the Whites defeated the Taman Red Army protecting Sorokin’s left 
flank. After a day’s battle, the Kuban’ Cossacks entered Ekaterinodar. Weeping crowds surged to 
meet them. The liberation army looked sunburned, dirty, and exhausted. Teenage boys, gray-
bearded men, and Cossack officers wore diagonal white stripes across their fur hats. They carried 
sawn-off shotguns, tsarist army carbines, and old hunting rifles.161    
Over the next several months, the Volunteer Army destroyed Soviet power in the North 
Caucasus. By November, the Whites secured Stavropol for the second time. Cossack cavalry 
chased the Reds out of town and spent the remaining weeks rooting out Soviets throughout the 
area. By the end of the month, they swept the Don country, the Kuban’, Stavropol, and Black Sea 
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regions practically clean. They established an anti-Bolshevik vendée line stretching over 300 
miles wide and extending 500 miles deep into the Don and Kuban’ interiors.162   
The mobility and striking speed demonstrated by Cossack cavalry won the Whites 
victories early in the war since the Bolsheviks initially scorned cavalry as both outdated and 
counterrevolutionary. By 1919, Leon Trotsky changed his mind. As well-trained cavalry officers 
and Cossack horsemen struck rapid blows at larger and slower Red forces and bolted to safety, 
the Soviets ordered the proletariat, “You must get on horseback.”163 Bolshevik commander 
Semyon Budyonny, an inogorodnye from the Don Cossack region, mirrored Cossack tactics to 
craft the Red cavalry into a terrifying force. The Cossacks often proved difficult to catch because 
they operated as their ancestors fought from a shifting base. This type of guerilla warfare worked 
since the Whites did not maintain a solid front. The Cossacks avoided the main Red Army, drove 
deep into their rear, and secured manpower and supplies from the local population. Unlike the 
generally disorganized revolts launched by peasants against Soviet power, the Cossacks aimed 
precise and organized blows at Bolshevik weak spots. Furious at their effectiveness, Trotsky 
demanded that the Cossack cavalry be “exterminated by all means available.”164   
This type of swift and relentless small-scale warfare enabled lesser White forces to 
disorganize and weaken larger Red forces. During the summer campaigns, some renegade British 
pilots, officially forbidden to engage in diplomatically dicey military support, took a few planes 
into the air to support the Whites. Allied aircraft zoomed above the battlefield to rake Bolshevik 
ambushes poised to massacre the Cossacks as they flew along a curve in the land in head-on lava 
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attack on the Soviet main body. The Bolshevik leadership recognized the destabilizing threat that 
Cossack raids posed to Soviet power. During 1919, Kuban’ Cossack warfare stabilized the North 
Caucasus and enabled Denikin to focus on invading the central Russia region to the north.165   
In summer 1919, the Cossacks and the Volunteers initiated a sweeping offensive aimed at 
securing industrial centers and taking the Soviet capital in Moscow. The massive offensive 
swung north as the thrust towards Moscow gained momentum. The war expanded into three 
fronts along the Donetz river basin, the north Don area, and the Manych River line. The Whites 
planned to send more Cossack units to mop up anarchist bands in the army’s rear, but the Rada 
resisted sending their troops so far from the home to infringe on the neighboring Don territory.166 
The push to Moscow persisted through August. By mid-month, a Red counterattack 
halted Wrangel’s advance and drove it back to Tsaritsyn. Don cavalry under Konstantin 
Mamontov engaged in raids towards Tambov while Denikin’s troops marched up the Dnieper 
River and secured Kiev. Early October found Don Army commander Vladimir Sidorin seizing 
Voronezh while Vladimir Mai-Mayevsky took Orel. Before heavy snow fell in October, Denikin 
poised to threaten Moscow. Lenin and the Soviet government prepared to flee.167  
 
Decline 
 
Overextended, cut off from industrial centers, suffering heavy casualties, and engaged in 
squabbles with the Rada over troop control, the White offensive ran down. Denikin struggled to 
hold the line between the Don and Manych Rivers. By late 1919, most cities captured by the 
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Whites began falling into Red hands. Sick and wounded numbers skyrocketed. Typhus, cholera, 
and typhoid raged through South Russia towns. By December, Denikin could only muster 42,000 
able-bodied soldiers out of a force that totaled 200,000 earlier that year. The surge that 
invigorated the Cossacks to raise a massive liberation effort the previous year drained away. 
Desertions increased as the men knew that hunger and terror stalked their families. Sick and 
demoralized Cossacks left for home. Others kept fighting through falling snow. Watching the 
White movement dissolve, the allied governments advised British, French and American troops 
to withdraw. Morale fell as there seemed no help and no way to stop the Bolsheviks.168  
In retreat, Denikin attempted to patch his relationship with the Cossack leaders. The 
Whites’ efforts to create a last-minute South Russian government revealed how much the anti-
Bolshevik movement relied heavily on Cossack support. A Supreme Krug gathered the Cossack 
hosts to hear Denikin promise a Constituent Assembly and land reforms that must have seemed 
like a vague dream. For the first time, the White leadership also permitted the “hated separatists” 
to form their own Kuban’ Army. Wrangel and Shkuro hit heads when each man arrived in 
Ekaterinodar to recruit soldiers for the Volunteer Army and the Kuban’ Army. For unknown 
reasons, White intelligence officers advised Shkuro that Wrangel planned to mount a coup to 
restore autocracy. This rumor encouraged Kuban’ Cossacks to join Shkuro’s forces rather than 
Wrangel’s army. The Kuban’ Army rapidly crumbled, opening fatal gaps in the White lines.169 
Tensions also intensified as Wrangel quarreled with Denikin about the need to turn 
Novorossiysk into an armed camp. Although Denikin quickly changed his mind and started 
fortifying the city, Wrangel declined to lead the Caucasian Army and resigned. In March, the 
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Kuban’ People’s Republic escaped to Novorossiysk. Retreating south, Denikin established a new 
base in the Crimea in the event of defeat. When the Reds recaptured Ekaterinodar, they drove the 
remaining Whites towards the Black Sea. Denikin’s officers voted to hand command over to 
Wrangel. Denikin resigned, named Wrangel as his successor, and fled. Trapped on the coast, a 
debacle ensued as 50,000 sick, wounded, and able-bodied troops, and thousands of frenzied 
civilians trampled each other to board too few ships. Denikin and his men crowded onto British 
ships, left the panicked crowds that they could not rescue behind, and sailed from the Crimea.170  
 During the retreat, the Volunteer Army abandoned thousands of Kuban’ Cossacks 
shielding their safe passage to the harbor. Some Cossacks fought their way out as the Reds came 
down the hills above the city. Others raced along the coast to meet ships that picked them up. 
Although some escaped into the mountains, pursued by Red cavalry, the Cossacks felt intense 
bitterness at the army’s actions that used them and then discarded them at a critical time.171  
 
Kuban’ Spring  
 
 With the anti-Bolshevik forces in ruins, the war temporarily went underground. Red 
soldiers swarmed the North Caucasus. People hid or fell into prison as the Bolsheviks transferred 
power to local Soviets. Rumors circulated that numerous rebels against Soviet power survived. 
The Cossacks that could not leave on the ships escaped via the Sochi and Tuapse road into the 
mountains around the Black Sea. Kuban’, Don, and Terek soldiers mingled with a swelling 
refugee crowd that clung to them for protection. Forty thousand soldiers and civilians stumbled 
through rough countryside, pursued by Red punitive units sent to wipe them out. Struggling over 
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mountain tracks, the Cossacks had to abandon most of their supplies during sudden skirmishes. 
Thin grass sprouted from thawing ground. Cossack horses gnawed bark from the trees. Half-
starved on a horse flesh and maize diet, the survivors finally reached the Terek River.172 
The Volunteer Army’s actions created a rift between the Cossacks and the anti-Bolshevik 
command. While some Cossacks joined the Red Army in an attempt to avoid execution, others 
determined to keep fighting joined General Nikolai Baratov’s Cossack Brigade in Teheran or 
fled into Georgia. Arriving in the Georgian state, the Cossacks offered their services to Keletch 
Sultan Hire who organized them into a cavalry regiment. Sent back to the North Caucasus, these 
units harassed the Reds, raided their supplies, and destroyed roads that the Soviets used to 
penetrate into the mountains to extend Bolshevik control. In April, officers and cadets that 
escaped with Wrangel laid plans to return. They hoped to join up with the Cossacks to recreate a 
Cossack uprising that successfully wiped the Bolsheviks from the Caucasus in 1918. As word 
spread that Wrangel planned a raid into the Kuban’ that summer, Sultan Hire sent the Cossacks 
back to raise a rebellion. Small Cossack groups with empty rifles maneuvered cautiously towards 
each other by word of mouth. Although some villages revolted against the Soviets, they failed to 
unite in sufficient numbers to stage a massive uprising.173  
On June 6, Wrangel’s forces invaded the Tauride steppe through Perekop on the Syvash  
marshes. By month’s end, the anti-Bolsheviks reclaimed the Crimea. On a hot summer night, 
Wrangel gathered Cossack generals and atamans at a small palace on the Crimean coast. During 
the evening meal, Wrangel worked to repair frayed relationships. Some leaders, embittered by 
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their treatment during the evacuation, felt reluctant to try again. The Whites considered the 
Kuban’ Cossacks slow to join the White cause and reluctant to fight later in the war. The anti-
Bolsheviks failed to recognize the Cossacks’ extreme fatigue and increasing anxiety over 
fighting so far from their villages. Although the Cossacks still clung to separatist ideas, they now 
split into two camps. When the Kuban’ People’s Republic dissolved, most Cossacks recognized 
the Soviets as a more serious threat than the Whites to their independence.174      
On August 8, Kuban’ Cossack General Sergei Ulagai initiated a mass amphibious landing 
to place 4,500 officers on the Black Sea coast to meet up with the Kuban’ Cossacks hiding in the 
hills. Around 1,200 officers and Cossacks with two mountain artillery guns under General 
Aleksandr Cherepov staged a distraction to draw Bolshevik fire so that the main force could land 
safely. The landing bogged down under heat and hazardous conditions. The officers had no food  
and little fresh water. The Cossacks that they planned to meet had no ammunition.175  
Since Cossack atamans in the Kuban’ and Ukraine could not break out into the open 
without weapons, the Whites had to make contact with them. White intelligence officers waded 
the Dnieper swamps north of Nikopol to find Cossack insurgent bands busy sabotaging 
Bolshevik transport and cutting Red communication lines. The Cossacks lived a precarious 
existence on the fringes of villages. Peasants often risked their lives to hide them in their huts. 
When the Cossacks needed horses, the peasants also freely gave them mounts and trusted their 
promises to return them. Led by Ataman Vilkorski, who reached out to General Alexander 
Kutepov for help, the Whites found ten atamans from the Union of Atamans waiting at Teoulik 
for supplies. Dressed in peasant clothes, the leaders wore revolvers at their hips and long kindjal 
daggers in their belts. They had no sabers or rifles. When the Whites brought twenty-five million 
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rubles in Bolshevik notes, 10,000 in tsarist currency, a few machine guns, and medical supplies, 
it became clear that these men cared very little for money. Instead, their eyes lit up at the 
ammunition and medical supplies that would help them continue to resist the Bolsheviks.176  
 The Black Sea woods also hid bands of White Army partisan groups. When Ulagai 
landed his troops on the coast, a small party moved uphill along a twisting mountain track 
searching for the Cossacks’ meeting place. Due to rumors that large Cossack numbers had 
rebelled against the Soviets, the White expected to meet around 4,000 Cossacks when they 
landed. Only about 300-400 Cossacks reached them in time. Near dawn, gunfire burst out on the 
beach below. When the Whites came ashore, they moved along the same narrow road that the 
first group navigated the night before. Halfway up the mountain, the Reds attacked. The ambush 
chopped the White column in half and captured the landing place during a savage battle. Still 
hoping to merge with the Cossacks to capture the railroad to Novorossiysk, Ulagai went on the 
offensive. When the Soviets realized that their cavalry failed to wipe out the landing party, they 
sent the Ninth Army and the Red North Caucasian Army to destroy Ulagai. Blocked and mined 
escape routes forced the Whites to evacuate the Kuban’ coast in a roundabout way and join the 
main assault force at Kerch. Despite heavy setbacks, the Whites expanded their attacks across the 
Dnieper River into Alexandrovsk, Zaporizhia, and the Donbas. By September, Ulagai returned to 
the Crimea while Don Cossacks under Kutepov harried the Reds into a retreat to the north. 
During the White assault on Kahovka, General Naumenko, the Rada mediator and Kuban’ 
Cossack Field Ataman, went down wounded by shrapnel. As the Whites and Cossacks 
regrouped, Budyonny’s cavalry destroyed Ulagai’s forces in less than three weeks.177    
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The war reached a crescendo in the Kuban’ by late 1920. On October 12, the Soviets 
signed a treaty that ended the Russo-Polish war. The Black Army, under Mikhail Frunze, joined 
the Bolsheviks and enabled them to focus their strength on crushing the Whites. Red numbers on 
the southern front soared to 146,000 soldiers and 40,000 cavalrymen. Wrangel’s army at best 
mustered 41,000 men. At their last stand in the Crimea, the Whites had 23,000 soldiers and 6,000 
Cossacks on the ground. Pushed back to a shrinking foothold, the Whites dug in on the Perekop 
isthmus. By November, only 10,000 White troops crouched in the trenches on Perekop with their 
backs to the old Turkish wall. Another 3,000 troops surrounded the Syvash marshes. The rest 
guarded the army’s rear. At night, the Soviets forded the marsh and launched an attack in six 
successive waves that hurled grenades and blasted General Mikhail Fostikov’s Kuban’ Cossacks 
with aircraft fire to wipe out the defenders from above. The attack failed. For the next four days 
the fight continued as water levels fluctuated in the Syvash. Finally, the Reds broke through the 
White line. With no other option, Wrangel pulled his army out and evacuated the Crimea.178  
 
Evacuation  
 
The anti-Bolsheviks resurrected the White movement against insurmountable odds. Even 
the Soviets could not believe how bitterly the Whites fought for each foot of Russian soil. “I am 
amazed at the enormous energy of the enemy’s resistance,” Frunze admitted to Lev Kamenev. 
“There is no doubt that he fought more fiercely and stubbornly than any other army would 
have.”179 The resurgent White movement had failed. The Reds burst into the Crimea. Panic 
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erupted as terrified civilians jostled with sick and wounded men trying to escape. During the 
winter retreat, many Kuban’ Cossacks fought their own war to get back to their stanitsas. Men 
gathered up their wives and children as they fled south. Fighting off Red attacks with dwindling 
ammunition, they finally reached the coast. British, American, and French vessels sailed around 
the shoreline, picking up troops at Sevastopol, Yalta, and Feodosia. The American ships had 
orders to only take soldiers on board if they threw away their weapons. Once more, the last 
Cossacks covering the Whites’ retreat found no place on the steamboats. When Wrangel realized 
that Fostikov’s First Kuban’ Division had set out for Kerch rather than to Feodosia where they 
could evacuate, he rushed General A. K. Abramov to pick them up at the strait. By the 
evacuation’s end, 145,693 people crowded onto the 126 ships that Wrangel had prepared. The 
refugee army, sick, impoverished, and displaced, landed on the Greek island at Lemnos. Fed and 
sheltered by the French, the Russian and Cossack exiles became stateless people in a sometimes 
pitying, sometimes hostile, and often indifferent post-wartime Europe.180   
 
Outlaws in the Hills 
 
 The Civil War did not end in 1920. With the Armed Forces of South Russia’s collapse, 
the Cossacks left behind turned into hunted wolves. The Whites’ defeat did not turn South Russia 
into a civilian landscape. Moscow’s “Secret Report” in spring 1921 still identified the Caucasus 
as a hostile front. Many Cossacks waged an irregular war against the Bolsheviks into the spring 
of 1921 and beyond. “The Cossacks could no longer defend themselves on their own land,” 
Trotsky concluded. “We had ourselves bound up their fate with that of the Volunteer army.”181 
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About 10,000 Cossacks who could not get on the evacuation ships escaped over the border into 
the Georgian mountains. The sheer terror that roused the Cossacks to rebel against the 
Bolsheviks and seal off their borders became a daily reality as the Soviets consolidated power in 
the North Caucasus. Famine stalked the villages. Prisons overflowed. By day, Cossack rebels lay 
low in the hills. At night, they crept out to nearby villages. Fading in from the dusk, they reached 
out to friendly villagers who slipped them any food that they could spare. During that winter, the 
Red Army and Cheka violently crushed Cossack uprisings in the Kuban’. Throughout October 
1922, Cossacks carried out organized raids along the Soviet border. In response, the Reds 
intensified their terror against the population. When local Chekists conducted mass executions, 
anti-Bolshevik rebels often burst into town and hung all the Soviets in revenge.182     
By 1923, the Soviets had still not subdued the Kuban’. The Bolsheviks labeled the 
Cossack partisans as “insurgents” and “bandits” and applied mass terror to stamp out their 
resistance. In the early twenties, Dunko, a Black Sea Cossack leader, fought till his last bullet 
when surrounded and then committed suicide to prevent the Reds from capturing him alive. 
Another Cossack band under a White Army colonel waged a guerilla war with the Soviets in the 
Kuban’ until at least 1926. Some hid among the Circassians in the mountains until the Second 
World War. Others fought until the Reds controlled the Georgian border and then melted away 
into Anatolia. After his ambush and death in 1924, Vasyuk, a Cossack officer who carried on his 
own war with the Bolsheviks, passed into local folklore. As a crowd gathered for Vasyuk’s 
funeral, twenty-five horsemen burst out of the steppe, careened into the cemetery, fired three  
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volleys over his grave, and then vanished in a cloud of dust.183     
In the fifth year since the revolution, the Soviets offered amnesty to “politically 
unconscious” peasants, regular criminals, bandits, and anti-Bolsheviks who came out and 
registered at the local Cheka headquarters. The Soviets threatened to hunt down anyone that did 
not appear. Tired, marginalized, and fearing for their family’s safety, some men took the chance. 
Despite the offer, most White officers and sympathizers did not actually qualify for amnesty. 
When officers and Cossacks appeared at the Cheka, the Soviets typically imprisoned or shot 
them on the spot. Cossack children often received years of hard labor or prison due to their social 
origins.184 As popular uprising continued throughout the Kuban’ villages, the Bolsheviks made 
no secret about the savage policies that they applied to the Cossacks. “We gunned down 
Cossacks officers leading the political gangs,” Anastas Mikoian, a close Stalin associate,  
reported. “Now we have no gangs.”185 The Soviets made it clear that they ruled over the North  
Caucasus as an exploited region and the Cossacks as a conquered people.  
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Decossackization 
 
During the unofficial Civil War period, the Soviet government took steps to ensure that 
the Cossacks as an ethnic group and independent military force would never rise against the state 
again. The Soviets not only deported numerous Kuban’ Cossacks and filled the void with Soviet 
citizens, but they enacted a systematic policy of terror and ethnic cleansing, amounting to an 
unrecognized genocide, called decossackization (raskazachivaniye). The Bolsheviks outlawed 
religious, military, and cultural symbols that might inspire revolt. Soviet laws criminalized non-
state religion, destroyed the voisko military structure, banned Cossack uniforms, and confiscated 
weapons. After the Cossack fight failed, the Soviets rounded up and hung most surviving 
members of the Kuban’ Rada.186 Through systematic hunting, surrounding small bands, cutting 
off resources and allies, and eliminating resistance leaders in the villages, the Bolsheviks 
gradually rounded up Cossack insurgent groups. With chilling accuracy, the Soviets identified 
Cossacks that they suspected had the capability to lead a community revolt. The Bolsheviks 
summarily executed atamans. They liquidated men and deported women to the Solovetsky Island 
concentration camps in the far north. Sometimes they shot entire families. In one mass arrest, the 
Reds sent 1,500 Kuban’ Cossack officers to northern labor camps. How many survived the 
treatment and subzero conditions is unknown. Soviet guards displayed leniency towards criminal 
prisoners but treated officers with ruthless brutality. Decossackization annihilated the Kuban’ 
Cossack population and stripped the Cossacks of their visible cultural identity.187     
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By 1930, Kuban’ Cossack identity and resistance remained a faint but persistent echo. 
The destruction of their freedoms that the Cossacks resisted so desperately became a reality in 
the decade following the White defeat. When Soviet agents arrived to enforce collectivization in 
the Kuban’, Cossack bandits waylaid them on lonely roads. As the Bolsheviks entered Kuban’ 
stanitsas to seize property, grain, and livestock and force the remaining villagers onto collective 
farms, the Cossack women put up a final fight. One Bolshevik writer reported that in these 
villages “all the men had been previously arrested.”188 The Soviets dragged the women, “crazy 
with fear and rage,” away from their children and forced them onto trains bound for prison 
camps in the tundra, Siberian forests, the Narym marshes, and deserts in Kazakhstan.189   
Although opposition grew weaker and less organized than in previous years, resistance 
still surfaced in the Don and Kuban’ during collectivization. “I would rather burn my grain than 
give it to the Bolsheviks,” one Cossack declared.190 When Kuban’ Cossacks resisted 
collectivization, the Soviets taxed them until they could no longer survive on the land. Many 
died from starvation. When families starved or these conditions forced them to sell their farms at 
a loss,  the land reverted to the kolkhoz administration.191 Cossacks who fought though the First 
World War and the Civil War maintained that they would rather “suffer the agonies of war than 
to continue living under Soviet rule.”192 Some Cossacks responded to Soviet coercion with their 
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own brand of Cossack volya. In 1925, thirty-four Kuban’ Cossack men, arrested for failure to 
pay heavy Soviet taxes, continuously sang hymns and “God Save the Tsar” to the Cheka guards 
as they sat in prison. Others went silent, simply hoping to survive.193       
By best records and estimates, the Soviets deported nearly one million Kuban’ Cossacks 
from the North Caucasus and replaced them with Red soldiers during the 1920s. By the 1930s, 
the Soviets continued to create ruses to bring Cossack separatists out of hiding. In 1936, Stalin 
proclaimed a free Kuban’ Cossack state near Rostov. In response, men put on old, forbidden 
Cossack uniforms and emerged to celebrate their freedom. Led by a Cossack commander, the 
soldiers paraded through the streets towards Soviet soldiers stationed in the military review 
stands who arrested them and exiled them to the arctic north.194 Following the Civil War, the 
Cossacks soon became the outsiders and a rapidly dwindling minority in their former land.195 
Those that survived continued to cling to their ethnic identity and the hope for a free Kuban’ 
Cossack state. “We always knew that we were Cossacks,” one peasant later insisted.196  
At the end of the Civil War, the western nations recognized the new state of Georgia as 
an independent nation but did not legitimize Cossack statehood. As a result, the Georgians could 
appeal for help against Soviet invasion into their sovereign state and voice their experience at 
Bolshevik hands. The Cossacks, as a stateless people, could not. After carrying out 
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decossackization in the Kuban’, the Soviet authorities remarked with satisfaction, “We shot as 
many Cossacks as Georgians . . . but the Cossacks could not cry out and even if they could no 
one would have believed them.”197      
 
“The Will of the People”   
 
The political shockwaves created by the Russian Empire’s fall cast long tremors that 
triggered ethnic minorities to initiate separatist movements during the twentieth century. In the 
early revolutionary days, the Kuban’ Cossacks created an independent state that resulted from 
conscious ethnic identity rather than an identity void. The revolution created a power gap that 
allowed Cossack leaders to expand self-rule traditions maintained within the soslovie to a 
national scale. Cossack motivations for state-building represented both particularism and 
universalism. The Cossacks fought to retain specific estate privileges while universalizing 
democratic suffrage. In a modern move that also demonstrated historical continuity, Cossack 
state-building reflected existing autonomous traditions and western self-determination concepts.  
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw a resurgence in Cossack-centrism. 
Kuban’ voisko histories reminded Cossacks about their unique Zaporizhian heritage. Many 
Kuban’ Cossacks retained strong ethnic features and visible culture that differentiated them from 
the Russian people. Unlike the Don, Terek, or Ural Cossacks who spoke Russian, Kuban’ 
Cossacks spoke their own Balachka language. The Cossacks’ democratic assemblies and 
decentralized location on the empire’s borders enabled them to nurture a distinctive identity. In 
the nineteenth century, the Cossacks resisted attempts to impose the zemstvo system on them. 
The zemstvo threatened to curb assemblies’ ability to vote for themselves and transfer power via 
delegates from the Cossack military administration to a Russian bureaucratic system. Atamans’ 
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local authority also increased as the government recognized the need to satisfy Cossack demands 
for greater self-rule in order to retain their beneficial service to the state. 
The Cossacks established a free Kuban’ state to enable the North Caucasus people to rule 
themselves and resolve political, social, and economic issues independent from Russian 
authority. While state-building demonstrated particularism, it also revealed how Cossack 
attitudes evolved towards non-Cossacks by the twentieth century. The more that the tsarist state 
used them for internal control, the more many Cossacks experienced social consciousness. The 
serious economic issues that military service imposed on the Cossacks and the Cossacks’ 
growing unhappiness at their use as a police force accelerated the estate system into an 
anachronism. While the government hoped to employ the Cossacks as a conservative bulwark 
against revolution, Cossack leaders exerted pressure in an opposing liberal direction.  
Problems in land and government emerged when the Cossacks and nonresidents failed to 
develop a viable land program and regional administration Despite a difficult history with the 
Caucasians and nonresidents, and their resistance to surrendering corporate land, some Rada 
members worked to integrate their neighbors into the local political process. The Rada finally 
found itself in a politically untenable position. The inogorodnye generally sided with the Soviets 
that they believed would award them Cossack lands. Despite sincere initial attempts at a 
universal democratic process, it proved difficult to satisfy both the Cossack and the nonresident 
peoples’ will because they could not reconcile their opposing goals. This resulted in political 
polarization and the inability to insulate the North Caucasus from Soviet power.  
The Civil War saw a continuing historical pattern in Cossack reactions to a central state. 
For a moment, full autonomy seemed within reach. Local atamans and village assemblies 
supported the Cossack independence movement as much as the Kuban’ elites. Dedicated to 
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democratic elections that reflected the people’s will, the Rada formed a separate state because 
each local assembly voted for self-determination. Monolithic Russian nationalism presented a 
fundamental obstacle to Cossack nationalism and self-rule. The struggle with the anti-Bolsheviks 
for military and administrative control fatally undermined the separatist movement. The 
Volunteer leadership relied on Cossack manpower to defeat the Bolsheviks and recreate a united 
Russian state in ways that violated Cossack democratic values. The Rada refused to recognize 
Denikin’s supreme authority because the Cossacks had not elected him.  
 When the White movement collapsed, the Cossacks found themselves fighting for 
vanishing freedoms and their right to exist in a terrifying new world. From the time that the 
Cossacks emerged as military and ethnic group, the Russian state used them to fight its wars 
when convenient. As an external threat receded, the government sought to curb the Cossacks as 
an independent force. The government used the estate system to secure their loyalty and harness 
the Cossacks’ military capabilities to control internal unrest and extend imperial authority into 
the frontier. The Cossacks’ military and economic participation in the estate system created a 
hiatus in Cossack resistance during the nineteenth century. Despite growing social and economic 
pressures intensified by military service, the symbiotic relationship between Tsar and Cossack 
made the Cossacks unlikely to resurface as a hostile force against the tsarist state.  
Like the tsarist state before them, the Soviets recognized the Cossacks’ potential to 
provide military support or raise rebellion. The Cossacks clung to prerevolutionary traditions and 
the old estate structure and largely rejected Soviet attempts to recruit them or alter their lifestyle. 
A stubborn anti-Bolshevik force that refused to subordinate itself to an authoritarian state could 
not exist. The Soviets understood how powerfully the Cossacks’ sense of homeland roused them 
to defend it. As a result, the Bolsheviks worked to systematically extinguish the Cossacks’ 
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corporate identity as Kubantsy and eradicate a sense of homeland. When the Bolsheviks failed to 
win the Cossacks over as a group, they destroyed their ethnic entity and military power. The 
Kuban’ Cossacks’ ancestry gave them an identity as a people rather than a profession, a fierce 
devotion to freedom, and stirred them to create an independent state during the Civil War. The 
Kuban’ remained a place solidly grounded in geographical reality. It also represented an 
imagined space and territory of the spirit. The idea of a free Cossack state persisted in the 
shadows of Cossack cultural memory into the present day. When Cossack state-building 
appeared in 1917, it reflected a growing modernity and emerged from a long history of Cossack 
struggle for self-rule. Resisting any political power that threatened to reduce their independence, 
the Cossacks remained a paradox in their historically changing relation to the state.   
 
 
Black Sea, Crimea: November 1920 
 
Fire flashed from the rooftops above the Crimea coast as Red soldiers poured down the 
mountains. On a hill above the sea, a group of exhausted Kuban’ Cossacks and horses huddled 
under the faded blue and red Kuban’ Republic flag. As the last ships faded in the distance, the 
Cossacks stared with tired and impassive eyes at the chaos churning below. Months earlier, 
Ataman Grishin appealed to the Cossacks to rise “for the will of the people, the land, and true, 
non-communist freedom.”198 For six years, from the Turkish passes to the Kuban’ steppes, they 
carried on a bloody war against authoritarian powers. That day, the rest of the Cossacks had fled 
along the Tuapse coast towards the Georgian border. For a moment the men stood motionless as 
the wind fluttered the tattered Kuban’ flag, then they crossed the border out of Russia forever.199 
 
 
198 Danchenko, 52  
199 Aten, 329.  
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